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Abstract 
How has Polish inequality evolved between communism and capitalism to reach one of the highest 
levels in Europe today? To address this question, we construct the first series on the long-term 
distribution of income in Poland by combining tax, household survey and national accounts data. We 
document a U-shaped evolution of inequalities from the end of the 19th century until today: (i) 
inequality was high before WWII; (ii) abruptly fell after the introduction of communism in 1947 and 
stagnated at low levels during the whole communist period; (iii) experienced a sharp rise with the 
return to capitalism in 1989. Between 1989 and 2015 the top 10% income share increased from 23% 
to 35% and the top 1% income share from 4% to 13%. Frequently quoted Poland’s transition success 
has largely benefited top income groups. We find that inequality was high in the first half of the 20th 
century due to strong concentration of capital income at the top of the distribution. The secular fall 
after WW2 was largely to a combination of capital income shocks from war destructions with 
communist policies both eliminating private ownership and forcing wage compression. The rise of 
inequality after the return to capitalism in the early 1990s was induced both by the rise of top labour 
and capital incomes. We attribute this to labour market liberalisation and privatisation. However, the 
strong rise in inequality in the 2000s was driven solely by the increase in top capital incomes, which is 
likely related to current globalization forces. Yet overall, the unique Polish inequality history speaks 
about the central role of policies and institutions in shaping inequality in the long run. 
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1. Introduction
Right from the beginning of modern economics an interest in distributional issues has constantly 
been present in economic and public discourse, varying strongly in its intensity from the initial 
enthusiasm of the classical economists,1 but often finding itself unjustifiably ousted at the margins 
of economic interest. In the middle of the twentieth century, Simon Kuznets renewed the 
enthusiasm and taught us about the inextricable interplay of inequality and economic growth in 
the process of economic development. However, the evolution of inequalities and its determinants 
are still not well understood. Our understanding of inequalities depends on the available empirical 
evidence, and as we have obtained new evidence, charting inequality further back in time, the old 
paradigms have been challenged and new ones developed. The research on top incomes (Kuznets 
1953; Piketty 2014; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010) has played a central role in charting these 
new modes of understanding by providing the empirical basis for path-breaking theories in the 
field.  
Although numerous developed countries have been extensively studied, surprisingly little attention 
has been devoted to Central and Eastern Europe. Importantly, Poland has been missing from the 
picture. The episodes of state formation, wars, socialism, transition into capitalism, and integration 
into the EU make Poland a particularly compelling case for studying determinants of income 
inequalities. Poland’s post-communist transition success has been frequently quoted (e.g. 
Piatkowski 2018). The real average national income per capita has more than doubled since 1990, 
but which income groups and income sources have benefited from it? What is the role of transition 
policies and emerging institutions in shaping inequality? Similarly, the new wave of globalization 
and capital-biased technological change have been crucial for the transformation of the Polish 
economy. Poland is the only major European country, which has recently experienced a substantial 
re/industrialization and growing share in the World’s GDP (Baldwin 2016). But we know little 
about distributional effects of these processes for the division of national income between capital 
and labour. Finally, how does Polish experience compare to western European countries, Russia, 
other former socialist countries in EU, or China and other developing countries?  
1
 For David Ricardo, it presented “the principal problem in political economy”. 
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This paper is a first comprehensive attempt to look at the long-run evolution of inequality in Poland 
in order to shed light on these questions. We combine tax, survey and national accounts data to 
provide consistent series on the long-term distribution of national income in Poland. First, we 
combine household surveys and income tax data in order to provide more reliable estimates of the 
full income distribution series in Poland for the 1983-2015 period. More precisely, we use tax data 
on high-income taxpayers to correct the top of the survey distribution. Next, we construct top 
income shares for the whole period from the end of the 19th century until today.2 We provide thus 
first homogeneous series that offer a possibility to compare the level and evolution of income 
inequality in Poland both through time and across countries. Our motivation is to fill the void in 
the literature and contribute to the understanding of the long-term determinants of inequality. Our 
work is also a part of the broader project of incorporating distributional statistics in the national 
accounts (Stiglitz et al. 2009; Alvaredo et al. 2016; Piketty et al. 2018; Bukowski et al. 2019). 
Figure 1 summarizes our main results on the long-run income inequality in Poland. Top income 
shares in Poland followed a U-shaped evolution from 1892 until today. Inequality was high in the 
first half of the 20th century due to high concentration of capital income at the top of the distribu-
tion. Initially, during the period of Partitions, top income shares experienced different trajectories 
in the Prussian and Austrian parts. A steady rise in the former contrasts with the stagnation in the 
latter. The end of the First World War and the immediate post-war development led to the sharp 
reduction in top income shares, owing to the shocks to capital income such as the wartime destruc-
tion, the hyperinflation of the early 1920s and the introduction of the anti-rich policies, including 
steeply progressive income and wealth taxation. During the interwar period, top income shares 
recovered from this low-point. The Great Depression resulted in further top concentration since 
top incomes were less adversely affected than the majority of the population consisting of small-
holding farmers. The proportionally lower decrease in incomes of top groups during the depression 
was largely procured by the rapid cartelization and intensified industrial concentration. As docu-
mented now in many countries, the post-WWII downward trend was induced by the fall in capital 
income concentration. The introduction of communism signified comparatively greater shock to 
2
 The reason we focus on top income shares for the earlier period is the absence of household survey data (see Section 
2). Nevertheless, it has been found that the evolution of top income shares reasonably well outlines the evolution of 
the overall income distribution through the 20th century (Roine and Waldenström 2015). 
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capital incomes relative to other countries, by literally eliminating private capital income with 
nationalisations and expropriations, while in addition it implied strong reduction of top labour 
incomes. During the remaining four decades of the communist rule, top income shares displayed 
notable stability at these lower levels. 
We analyse the transition from communism to the market economy by constructing the full income 
distribution (1983-2015) from combined tax and survey data. Figure 2 presents our series on the 
income distribution. We show that within one generation, Poland has moved from being one of 
the most egalitarian to one of the most unequal countries in Europe. Inequality experienced a sub-
stantial and steady rise after the fall of communism, which was driven by a sharp increase in in-
come shares of the top groups within the top decile. The highest increase took place immediately 
at the outset of the transition in the early 1990s, but we also find a substantial growth since the 
early 2000s, after Poland joined the EU. In fact, top income groups have been main beneficiaries 
of strong Polish growth in the 2000s. Over the whole 1989-2015 period, top 1% has captured 
almost twice as large portion of the total income growth than the bottom 50% (24% versus 13%). 
The middle 40 per cent and bottom 50 per cent income shares experienced a similar evolution 
characterized by a stable fall from the transition until the mid-2000s, and a stagnation afterwards. 
These results stay in contrast to the official survey-based measures, which substantially underesti-
mate the rise of inequality since the end of communism, primarily by underestimating the top of 
the income distribution 
The rise of inequality after the return to capitalism in the early 1990s was induced both by the rise 
of top labour and capital incomes. We attribute this to labour market liberalisation and privatisa-
tion. However, the strong rise in inequality in the 2000s was driven solely by the increase in top 
capital incomes, which are dominant sources of income for the top percentile group. The labour 
income, in turn, dominates for the group below the top percentile. We relate the rise in top capital 
incomes to current globalization forces and capital-biased technological change, which have po-
tentially rebalanced the division of national income in favour of capital.  
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Figure 1: Top 1 per cent income share in Poland 1892-2015 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics. Distribution of fiscal income among tax units. Note: the 
Prussian Poland is the Province of Posen and West Prussia, Galicia is the Austrian partition. For 1925-1937 Poland is 
the Second Polish Republic (with 1918-1939 borders), for 1992 Poland is the Third Polish Republic (with post-1945 
borders). 
Figure 2: Income shares in Poland 1983-2015 
Source: authors’ computation. Distribution of pre-tax national income (before taxes and transfers, except pensions and 
unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults. 
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Today, Polish top income shares are at the level of more unequal European countries, most notably 
Germany and the United Kingdom, but still substantially below those documented in Russia (No-
vokmet et al. 2018a). A more moderate increase of inequality in Poland than in Russia is related 
to more inclusive transition policies, to different institutions and natural resources endowments. 
However, income concentration in Poland is higher than in other former socialist countries in the 
EU, owing to relatively higher number of affluent entrepreneurs, plausibly benefiting from the 
larger domestic market. Finally, the evolution of Polish top incomes bears similarities to China 
(Piketty et al. 2019; Novokmet et al. 2018b), which suggests that inequality has risen both at mid-
dles (e.g., Poland or China) and ends (e.g., the US or Germany) of the global value chains (Autor 
et al. 2014; 2016; Balsvik et al. 2015).3 
Our paper is closely related to the voluminous literature looking at the relationship between 
inequality and economic growth. Kuznets (1953) has constructed first top income shares for the 
US, which served as the empirical basis for the inverted-U curve, according to which inequality 
rises in early phases of economic development but falls eventually as the growth advances 
(Kuznets 1955). Economists have generally applied the ‘demand and supply of skills’ framework 
to explain changes in inequality (see i.e. Acemoglu 2002; Card and DiNardo 2002). The recent 
rise of inequality has been perceived as a by-product of technological change that has been spurring 
economic growth and bringing exorbitant rewards to few visionary entrepreneurs. But inequality 
is bound to fall eventually as these innovations permeate the economy and new skills are acquired 
by the rest of the society, most importantly through education (Tinbergen 1974; Goldin and Katz 
2008). But, the revival of the Kuznets’s pioneering study (1953) by Piketty (2001, 2003) has 
challenged this optimistic view, as we observe continuously growing inequalities.4 Piketty (2014) 
has recently offered a more sombre view of the growth-inequality link, according to which 
unrestrained capitalist development inevitably leads to rising inequality. He believes that the ‘great 
3
 Baldwin (2016) describes Poland as one of the ‘Industrializing Six’ countries with growing share of manufacturing 
(next to China, Korea, India, Indonesia and Thailand) and the ‘Rising Eleven’ countries with rising global share of 
GDP.
4
 In addition to the skill-biased technological change, economists have explored alternative explanations, especially 
processes connected with the new wave of globalization (e.g., Autor et al 2016), institutional changes (e.g., Machin 
and van Reenen 2007), tax policy favouring the richest, (e.g., Piketty et al. 2014) or increasing wealth inheritance 
(e.g., Alvaredo et al. 2013).  
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levelling’ of the twentieth century was a historically unique episode and that there is no 
spontaneous fall in inequality. 
This study shows the central role of policies and institutions in shaping inequality in the long run. 
The communist system eliminated private capital income and compressed earnings, which led to 
the sharp fall and decades-long stagnation of the top income shares. By the same token, the labour 
market liberalisation and privatisation during the transition instantly increased inequalities and 
brought them to the level of countries with long histories of capitalism. On the other hand, a 
marked increase in social transfers during first transition years played the key role in ‘protecting’ 
the bottom 50% of the distribution and provided the general political support for the market re-
forms and enterprise restructuring in Poland (Keane and Prasad 2002). This stands in contrast to 
the Russian transition, where the bottom 50% share collapsed, and suggests that mitigating a more 
substantial rise in inequality may be actually conducive for economic growth (Banerjee and Duflo 
2003, Sukiassyan 2007). Overall, the unique Polish inequality history suggests that the rise of 
inequality is not inevitable and, most importantly, that the future will depend on the institutions 
and policies taken. 
Finally, the recent developments suggest that the future of inequalities in Poland is likely to be 
linked with the prominent role of capital income among top incomes. Moreover, one should not 
expect a weakening of this trend, as processes connected with globalisation and technological 
change seem to contribute to the growing dominance of capital in the economy. Rising inequalities 
might have adverse social and political implications, as evident in the recent populist anti-global-
ization backlash in Poland and internationally (Piketty 2018, Eichengreen 2018, Rodrik 2018, Fu-
kuyama 2018). The issue of distribution of gains from economic growth has become thus crucial 
for sustaining the long-run development. We hope that our work will be a contribution in how to 
approach these imminent challenges. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes data sources and methodology. Section 3 
presents trends of the top income shares since the end of the 19th century until the end of com-
munism. Section 4 presents the evolution and composition of the full income distribution since 
1983 until today, and discusses the potential mechanism at play. Section 5 compares the estimates 
8 
for Poland with other countries. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The details of the data and estimation 
are discussed in the appendix.  
2. Data and Methodology
We combine tax, survey and national accounts data to construct our measures of long-run income 
distribution. First, we construct new consistent series on the entire income distribution for the 
1983-2015 period. More precisely, we correct the top of the household income survey distribution 
with administrative tax data on high-income taxpayers. The methodology follows the 
Distributional National Accounts (DINA) guidelines (Alvaredo et al. 2016). For the earlier period, 
we focus on top income shares due to the absence of viable household survey data. We combine 
income tax and national accounts data to construct top income shares for the whole period from 
the end of the 19th century until today. Appendixes A.1–A.4 discuss in detail the data and 
methodology. 
2.1. Data sources 
Income Tax Statistics in Poland. We first present data sources on income tax statistics, which 
present the central block for the construction of top income shares and the distributional national 
accounts. The first modern income tax in the Polish lands was established by the Prussian (1891) 
and Austrian Empires (1898) during the Partitions of Poland. Both Prussian and Austrian income 
tax statistics provide tabulations of income taxpayers in a regional breakdown, which has allowed 
us to construct top income shares for provinces with significant Polish population (Pomerania, 
Posen, Silesia, West Prussia in Prussia; Galicia in Imperial Austria). There is no tax data for the 
Russian Partition (the Congress Kingdom), as comprehensive income tax was never introduced in 
the Imperial Russia. 
In 1924 the newly independent Poland introduced a unified progressive income tax for its whole 
territory. Detailed interwar income tax statistics were published separately for unearned income 
(fundowany) and earned income (niefundowany), organised by a large number of income brackets 
containing the number of taxpayers in each bracket and their corresponding tax obligation.5 The 
5
 See Appendix A.1.3  on how we combine tabulations for unearned and earned income. 
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total income in brackets is missing, but bracket ranges are quite narrow, and consequently, 
estimates of total bracket income are robust to the specific distributional assumptions (see 
Appendix A.1.3 for more details). 
The communist government was established in 1945, but the interwar income tax system was still 
in use for several years, and the income tax tabulations are available for 1945-7. However, with 
the waves of nationalisation and the elimination of the private sector in the late 1940s, the personal 
income tax de-facto disappeared along with tax statistics. Instead, the communist government 
published detailed wage statistics annually since 1956, which covered almost the entire 
workforce. 6  Since the private capital income played a marginal role in the Polish socialist 
economy,7 top earnings provide a reasonably good approximation of top incomes development.  
For the post-communist era, income tax data come from the annual reports on the settlement of 
the personal income tax (PIT). The tax administration has published annual income tax tabulations 
since 1992. Tabulations are organised by income ranges that correspond to tax brackets as defined 
by the progressive tax schedule, with each bracket containing the number of taxpayers, their total 
income, deductions and the corresponding tax obligation. Due to the limited progressive structure 
of Polish PIT, the number of brackets in published statistics has been relatively small (generally 
equal to three for the post-communist period), with more than 90% of taxpayers located in the 
bottom bracket. As a result, although a great majority of population is subject to PIT, the available 
income tax tabulations cannot be used to recover the entire income distribution. Instead, we use 
information on high-income taxpayers in combination with the household survey data. The sources 
of income tax statistics are provided in Appendix A.1.6. 
Household income surveys. Household budget survey (HBS) has been regularly conducted in 
Poland since 1957. Until 1972, it covered only employees in socialized sector excluding 
agriculture. Thereafter, it was conducted for four types of households:  worker, mixed, farmer, and 
pensioner households (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992, pp. 258-263). The survey underwent 
6
 Covering both state and cooperative enterprises (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992, p. 257).  
7
 The bulk of non-wage private income was largely concentrated in the small-scale agriculture, characterised by the 
low productivity and the small earning potential, and thus plausibly did not contribute to top incomes. 
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important changes after 1990, becoming fully representative of the population (Kordos et al 2002; 
Milanović 1999; Keane and Prasad 2000). 
For the 1980s, we use the Polish Household Budget Survey (HBS) data from Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992, Tables PI1 and PI2). The authors provide tabulations of the individual 
distribution of household income per capita by combining the distribution of income for four types 
of households from the official HBS reports.8 The tabulations are organized by eight income 
groups, providing in each the number of individuals and the mean income. For the 1992-2004 
period, we use harmonised HBS microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Finally, for 
the period 2005-2015, we use the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
collected by Eurostat. We harmonize the definition of income and the unit of analysis across the 
surveys (see Appendix A.2.1). 
National accounts data. We construct the total income and population controls based on the 
definition of income and the tax unit in the tax code. For the 1992-2015 period, we use National 
Accounts data published by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS). For the interwar period 
we rely on historical series published by Kalecki and Landau (1934), as well as series constructed 
for the Maddison project (Bolt et al. 2018). The data for the period before World War I comes 
from the Prussian and Austrian censuses, yearbooks and various monographies (see Appendixes 
A.1.1–1.2.).  
2.2. Methodology 
There have been long-standing attempts to combine various data sources in order to produce 
consistent series on the distribution of national income over time and across countries. One of the 
pioneering works was done on Poland by Jan Wiśniewski (1934), who combined numerous data 
sources, such as income tax data, occupational ‘social tables’, census data, in order to estimate the 
income distribution in Poland in 1929. In recent years, the large body of empirical work on the 
income distribution has estimated long-run series of top income shares, by combining income tax 
tabulations with national accounts totals for the population and the income, and using Pareto 
8
 The official HBS reports during socialist Poland give separate presentation for four household types and do not 
provide distributional data for all households. 
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interpolation techniques. The methodology was pioneered by Kuznets (1953) and recently 
advanced by Piketty (2001, 2003), Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010), among others. We produce 
top income shares in Poland for the whole period from 1892 until 2015. All details are provided 
in Appendixes A.1–A.4.  
Although tax data has proven to be especially useful to chart the long-term dynamics at the upper 
end of the distribution, they are however silent on the remaining part of the distribution. On the 
other hand, it is well documented that household income surveys underestimate top incomes,9 
which can critically impact overall distributional measures and misread the general trends in the 
income distribution (Piketty and Saez 2003; Atkinson et al. 2011). Consequently, there have been 
various attempts to combine administrative tax and survey data to obtain more reliable estimates 
of the income distribution (e.g. Burkhauser et al. 2016; Piketty et al. 2018). A major progress in 
this direction has been made by the WID.world project. We follow its Distributional National 
Accounts guidelines (Alvaredo et al. 2016; Piketty et al. 2018) in the construction of 
comprehensive measures of income distribution in Poland.   
The general methodology we use to combine survey and fiscal data consists of two basic steps. In 
the first step we use the raw survey tabulations and generalized Pareto interpolation techniques 
(Blanchet et al. 2017) to estimate series on the distribution of survey income by generalized per-
centiles (g-percentiles).10 In the second step, we use tax data on high-income taxpayers to correct 
upwards the survey series and obtain corrected estimates of the distribution of fiscal income. We 
assume that survey data provide a reasonable description of the income distribution below the 85th 
percentile. On the other hand, we take that tax data is accurate above the percentile corresponding 
9
 Most importantly, due to higher non-response and under-reporting among richer respondents, as well as due to spe-
cific survey collection constraints and top coding. 
10
 As explained in Alvaredo et al. (2016, p. 15) “G-percentiles files use 127 rows: 99 for the bottom 99 percentiles, 9 
for the bottom 9 tenth-of-percentiles of the top percentile, 9 for the bottom 9 one-hundredth-of- percentiles of top 
tenth-of-percentile, and 10 for the 10 one-thousandth-of-percentile of the top one-hundredth-of-percentile.”  
12 
to the first available income threshold in tax tabulations (generally corresponding to the 95th per-
centile).11 We then apply the piecewise-linear correction factors f(p) between these percentiles.12  
In our accompanying work in progress (Bukowski et al. 2019) we show that the above 
methodology produced series on income inequality remarkably similar to those based on the 
registry database of the universe of individual-level tax returns for the period 2004-2017 (see also 
Kośny 2012 for Lower Silesia).13  
Unit of observation. The unit of observation is the individual aged 20-year-old or more. 
Household income in survey is equally split between adults who belong to the same household. 
We should bear in mind that when combining survey and tax data we make implicit assumptions 
that high-income individuals in tax data are either singles, or that spouses have reported equal 
income. Since the option of joint filing for couples is widely used (the tax unit in the tax code is 
individual), it is reasonable to assume that eligible high-income taxpayers file a joint declaration 
by equally splitting their income in order to reduce their tax obligation.14 According to the PIT 
reports, the majority of eligible taxpayers used the joint taxation.15  
Further issue is that the homogeneity over time can be impaired by changes in the tax unit in the 
tax code. While the data for the communist and post-communist period relates to individual units, 
11
 We find this assumption fairly robust by checking different variant series using p0=0.8 and p0=0.9.  
12
 More precisely, the upgrade factor between survey and fiscal income is 1 for P85 and rises linearly to the observed 
factor in the tax and survey data. We also apply linear correction factors between empirical thresholds from the tax 
tabulations. 
13
 Because of the regulation at the Ministry of Finance of Poland, we are not able to use the individual-level tax data 
in this paper.  
14
 We use equal-split-adults series within the household rather than within the couple as our benchmark, because the 
Household Budget Survey (used for the 1983-2004 period) reports a substantial part of the household income only at 
the household level. Since the tax data relates to income split within couples, we have implicitly assumed that nuclear 
families prevail in Poland today (especially in the case of higher income households), and this should not result in any 
significant bias. 
15
 In 2000, almost 62% taxpayers used joint taxation, after the linear taxation has been introduced in 2004, 58% of 
those using progressive schedule used this option, and in 2016 the share fell to 48%. In comparison, the share of 
married in working age population was 64% in 2000 and 55% in 2016 (GUS 2017). Therefore, a substantial share of 
marriages used joint taxation, and the downward trend in the share of joint fillings could be due to a falling share of 
married people throughout this period.  
Furthermore, we have adjusted downwards thresholds and average incomes in the income tax tabulations after 2004, 
in order to account for the fact that taxpayers under the ‘business’ flat tax schedule cannot use the joint-filing option 
and split their income with their spouses. See Appendix A.1.6. 
13 
the tax unit in Austria, Prussia, and in interwar Poland was household, with the total income of 
household members ascribed to the head of the household. This makes a discontinuity in the series 
after 1947, however, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) suggest that the potential bias should not 
affect the general trend in top income shares. The total number of households is estimated as all 
adult above 20 years of age minus the number of married females. The corresponding data is taken 
from population censuses and annual figures from the statistics on the movement of the population, 
and linearly interpolated for missing years.  
Definition of Income. We focus on the distribution of pre-tax income, which refers to the sum of 
all income flows going to labour and capital, plus pensions but before other taxes and transfers. 
This income concept corresponds to the concept of fiscal income reported in the income tax 
statistics (Alvaredo et al. 2016; Piketty et al. 2018).16 
Taxable income in both Austria and Prussia, as well as in the interwar period was quite broad and 
allowed very few exemptions. The post-communist tax data include income from employment, 
pensions, income from non-agricultural business activity and special agricultural activity, income 
from self-employment, rental income and income from other sources. 17  We account for the 
changes in the tax law, which modify the definition of income. There were no major reforms of 
the tax system during the interwar period. However, the post-communist tax law has been amended 
several times since 1992. Most importantly, since 2004 income from non-agricultural business 
activity (further referred as business income) can be taxed separately using a newly introduced flat 
tax. See Appendix A.1.6. for all details how we combine statistics on business income taxed at 
linear rates and income taxed using the progressive scale.   
As noted, when joining the survey and tax data, we produce the distribution of fiscal income.18 A 
distinction needs to be made between fiscal income and national income, which is defined as GDP 
16
 This income concept has been typically labeled as ‘gross income’, which refers to income before all personal de-
ductions and personal income taxes (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010). Note that the gross definition is after subtrac-
tion (from revenues) of costs needed to obtain, secure and maintain income. 
17
 Capital income in the form of dividends and interests is taxed separately at a source and thus not included in the 
statistics for the progressive schedule. However, most of the income derived from business activity is taxed at the 
individual level as income from non-agricultural business (see below).  
18
 We calculate income distribution in household surveys consistent with the fiscal income concept. 
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minus consumption of fixed capital plus net foreign income (SNA 2008). A major difference is 
due to the fact the national income includes in addition tax-exempt capital income, such as undis-
tributed corporate profits or imputed homeowners’ rents. We do not impute these items due to data 
availability, but, in general, it has been found that the fiscal correction (using income tax data) 
accounts for the bulk of upward correction of raw survey inequality, and further adjustment for the 
distribution of tax-exempt capital income has showed to be of limited importance (e.g. Piketty et 
al. 2019). Most importantly, correcting income distribution by imputing corporate retained earn-
ings is less important in Poland, because business income is predominantly taxed according to the 
pass-through concept and hence attributed to individuals (Kopczuk 2012; Alstadsæter et al. 
2017).19 Alstadsæter et al. (2017, Table 1) show that Poland has by far the highest share of em-
ployment in pass-through entities in Europe. Finally, in order to allow an international comparison, 
we scale fiscal income distribution up to the national income totals by proportionally upgrading 
thresholds and average incomes for each percentile of the fiscal income distribution.  
3. Top Income Shares in Poland 1892-1989
This section presents the evolution of top income shares in Poland since 1892 until 1989. Over this 
period, Poland has experienced dramatic economic and political transformations. We start with a 
brief summary of the Polish economic growth and major historical episodes since the end of the 
19th century. Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries the real income per adult in Poland has been 
around half of the income in Western Europe (Figure A1). The gap widened during the communist 
period, especially in the 1980s, and has narrowed after the transition in 1989. Today, Poland is 
considered by the World Bank as a high-income country. 
Table 1 summarizes the major episodes in the Polish history since the 19th century. We follow this 
historical periodization in our analysis, as we believe that the specific historical setting and chang-
ing institutional frameworks are essential in shaping inequality in the long run. 
19
 The ‘pass-through’ approach of taxing business income is applied to unincorporated entities, where business income 
is attributed to the owner who is taxed under the personal income tax.  Most domestic firms in Poland are 
unincorporated businesses (Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland (annual). Chapter: Privatization. Entities of the 
National Economy). Alternatively, business income of incorporated entities is taxed under the corporate tax, and 
subsequently taxed at the individual level when distributed (Alstadsæter et al. 2017). As we show in Figure A11, this 
legal form has been chiefly used by foreign-owned corporations. 
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Table 1: Major Episodes in the Polish History since the 19th Century
1772 – 1918 
The Partitions of Poland between Austria, Prussia, and Russia. As a result, Poland was removed 
from the map of Europe for 123 years. The occupying Empires imposed their own institutions. 
1914 – 1918 World War I – the occupying Empires fought on the opposite sides, leading to a massive destruc-tion on the Polish lands. 
1918 – 1939 Interwar Poland – the country was re-created and gained a full independence. It drifted from dem-
ocratic parliamentary republic towards authoritarian presidential republic. 
1939 – 1945 World War II – Poland was occupied by Germany and Soviet Union, and experienced the biggest 
relative war losses. Approximately 17% of the 1939 population were killed. 
1945 – 1989 
Communism – Soviet communist system with a centrally planned economy was introduced. Al-
most a complete elimination of private capital income, through e.g. nationalisation or expropria-
tion.  
  1989 – Capitalism – a market based economy with parliamentary democracy was re-established. In 2004 
Poland joined the European Union.  
3.1. Partitioned Poland and World War I 
The three Partitions displayed different levels of economic development as well as specific 
institutions and different social conditions. 20  Only Prussia and Austro-Hungary introduced a 
comprehensive income tax in the Polish lands. We construct top income shares for the Austrian 
and Prussian partitions. Unfortunately, we omit the Russian partition as there are no 
comprehensive tax sources available.  
Figure 1 shows the top 1 per cent income shares in Poland since 1892 until today (see Table A1 - 
Table A3).21 We start with the Prussian Partition. It can be seen that following a moderate rise 
20 The best economic situation was in the Prussian part, where the authorities carried out many reforms including the 
abolition of serfdom. The agriculture, rather than industry, was the main driver of the economic progress. In the 
Russian partition, it was the industry that developed the most. The delayed abolition of serfdom reforms during the 
second half of the 19th century contributed to the relative backwardness of the agriculture in the Congress Kingdom. 
However, the worst economic situation was in the Austrian part. Before the end of the 19th century, Galicia had not 
been industrialized, and the agriculture was under invested and parceled. 
21
 Malinowski and van Zanden (2017) provide the estimates of the income distribution for the preindustrial Poland. 
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since the 1890s until 1914, top inequality increased sharply by 7 percentage points after the out-
break of World War I. The overall rise in top income shares was mostly driven by very high-
income shares (see Figure A2 and Figure A3, Table A4) and almost exclusively due to a rise of 
very high incomes in the rural areas, while shares of urban incomes remained surprisingly stable 
throughout the whole period under consideration (Figure A4).22 We believe that an explanation 
for the documented rise of top income shares in the Prussian partition should be sought in the 
growth of the commercial capital-intensive agriculture (Dumke 1991) and development of related 
industries (such as distilleries, mills or machines for agriculture, etc.) (Perkins 1984, Grant 2005, 
Eddie 2008).23 The functional shift towards capital income in agriculture was dominantly captured 
by the top of the distribution because of relatively high land inequality – an outcome of the Prussian 
land reforms, which favoured larger estates at the cost of smallholdings (Mieszczankowski 1960; 
Grant 2005; Eddie 2008, 2013). Large estates were the driving force behind the structural trans-
formation of agriculture in East Elbia, in what has often come to be generalised as the ‘Prussian’ 
road to industrialisation (Lenin 1908). 
 
The emergence of agrarian capitalism in Prussian Poland was spurred by external and internal 
factors. Changes in the terms of trade induced a shift from traditionally dominant grain production 
to capital-intensive industrial crops, 24  such as sugar beet. Mass migrations from the east to 
industrial regions in western Germany and across the Atlantic led to the growing shortage of labour 
and subsequent rise in agricultural wages (Wolf 2006). At the same time, the economic nationalism 
of the Prussian government curbed immigration of the abundant cheap labour from the Russian 
and Austrian partitions. Despite the campaigns of Prussian landlords for looser immigration policy, 
the Prussian authorities endeavoured instead in alternatives such as providing eastern agriculture 
with additional capital (Wolf 2006). Growing capital-intensity of agriculture likely contributed to 
                                                 
22 To be more precise, the rise of top incomes in rural areas and stagnation in urban areas was a characteristic of the 
Province of Posen – the largest and most important part of the Prussian Partition. In the second province, Western 
Prussia, we do not report differences between rural and urban areas. See Bukowski and Novokmet (2017) for more 
details.  
23
 Dumke (1991) finds that the capital share in national income increased during the industrialization in Prussia due 
to the rise of the capital share in agriculture. There was a concurrent rise in income inequality. 
24
 This gradual turn from traditionally dominant grain production in the eastern provinces was largely motivated by 
the availability of the cheap grain import from the ‘New World’ and Russia, caused by a fall in transport costs, and 
the introduction of the grain tariffs could not have halted this trend (Wolf 2006). Germany gradually became the net 
importer of grain and lost in addition its traditional grain export markets as Britain. 
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a spectacular improvement in productivity in the Prussian partition between 1882 and 1907, 
surpassing that in the rest of Germany (see Figure A5, Tipton 1976, Grant 2002).25  
The Austrian Partition (also known as Galicia) was economically the least developed of the three 
‘partitioned’ Polish regions.26 Top income shares in Galicia showed no clear trend in the two 
decades preceding WW1 (Figure 1). The top 1 per cent income share increased by almost 3 
percentage points in the short period from 1898 until 1901, when it peaked at 14.3 per cent. 
Afterwards we observe a falling trend during the years preceding WW1. We believe that top 
incomes in Galicia were dominantly an urban phenomenon. As shown in Figure A6, 27  the 
predominance of employment income might suggest that employees in towns, such as in banks or 
imperial administration, lived much better than the surrounding rural population – overwhelmingly 
living at the bare subsistence level.28 Similarly, top incomes presumably included modest business 
activities in cities, carried on dominantly by Jews engaged in commerce, handicraft and smaller-
scale industry (McCagg 1989). 29  As we look below, the rural-urban income gap figured 
prominently during the interwar period. Among the interwar Polish counties, those located in 
Galicia were characterized by the highest correlation between urbanisation ratio and top 1% 
income shares (see Appendix A.3). 
Top income shares in the Prussian partition soared during World War I (Figure 1 and Figure A2, 
Table A4). The economic environment favoured the capital owners, especially due to the wartime 
25 For instance, the yield of potatoes and wheat in quintal per hectare doubled between 1878-1882 and 1909-1913 
(Wolf 2006, p.39).
26
 The area was fully incorporated into Poland in 1918, but only the western part remained in the country after 
WWII.
27 We cannot ascertain income sources of particular top groups, as there is no source breakdown for specific tax brack-
ets, but only the income decomposition of those subject to the income tax (approximately the top 2-3 per cent income 
group).
28
 Smallholdings coupled with prevailing backward agricultural techniques remained the main characteristic of the 
Galician agriculture. In 1902, one-third of agricultural holdings were smaller than 2 hectares and 60% less than 5 
hectares (only 1.2% larger than 20 hectares) (Bujak 1908). Clearly, such dwarf holdings could not secure even the 
minimum existential needs. Regional specialization in agricultural products was further impeded due to more efficient 
competition from Hungary and Moravia, as well as high tariffs in the Prussian and Russian partitions (Landau and 
Tomaszewski 1985, p. 16).  
29
 There were only a few industries of some importance in Galicia, such as the crude oil industry, salt mining or 
distilling. The former, in particular, was a source of never realized dreams of economic prosperity. Galicia produced 
in 1909 almost 5 per cent of the world output of crude oil and gave rise to several men of substantial wealth, such as 
industry pioneers Szczepanowski or McGarvey (Frank 2005).  
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demand for armament and food. The shortage of raw materials, critical for the war economy, 
brought huge profits to Silesian mining industry and its ‘coal barons’ residing at the top of the 
income distribution. The Allied blockade was the root cause of the German food problem, as it 
caused a plunge in food imports (Ritschl 2005). Food shortages led to a surge in prices, bringing, 
in turn, extraordinary profits to agricultural producers, which were proportionally more 
concentrated in Prussian Poland. It may be thus indicative that the greatest increase in top income 
shares occurred in 1916. In that year, German food imports had collapsed due to a halt of imports 
from neutral countries, namely from Denmark and Netherlands, which were important supply 
source during the first two years of the war (Ritschl 2005, Hardach 1977).30 
3.2. Interwar Poland 
The unification of Poland in 1918 is one of the pivotal events in the Polish history. Po-land was 
established on the world map after 123 years under foreign dominions. This century-long dream 
had to be, however, realised in quite a tumultuous atmosphere of economic crisis, broken interna-
tional trade, and recovery from the massive destructions and human losses of the Great War.  
Our starting point in the interwar period (1924) coincides with the lowest documented point in top 
income shares during the existence of interwar Poland, with the share of the top percentile slightly 
above 8 per cent (Figure 1). There are several arguments in favour of the lower top shares in the 
first half of the 1920s. First, Poland was among countries that suffered greatest losses during the 
First World War, both in the number of human casualties as well as in the extent of physical de-
struction. The level of industrial production in 1919 was less than 15 per cent of its 1913 level 
(Landau 1968). Deleterious effects of exogenous shocks to capital income in the interwar period 
are now well documented as the single most important reason behind the secular fall in top incomes 
initiated after the First World War (Piketty 2001; 2003; Scheidel 2017). One should add on top of 
30
 In the same manner, the recovery of food imports with the seizure of Romania in 1918 might have alleviated the 
pressure on food prices (Ritschl 2005). Note in this respect a surge in top income shares in neutral countries during 
WW1, such as Netherlands, Denmark or Sweden, who directly benefited from the boom in international food and 
commodity prices. 
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that a tremendous effort of German and Russian troops in dismantling factories during their re-
spective retreats (Davies 2005; Landau 1968).31 The Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1920 further dis-
rupted the industrial production and broke the supply chains (Landau and Tomaszewski 1984). 
Second, the risk of political radicalization and the communist upheaval pressured the new leader-
ship of Poland into passing the new social legislation, such as eight-hour working day, trade unions 
or right to strike (Sztrum de Sztrem 1922; Derengowski 1930; Wolf 2007). Further, various anti-
capital policies were introduced, including the land reform, a sharp increase in tax progressivity32 
and heavier taxation of capital than labour.33 Industrial capital tied in export sectors especially 
suffered from the loss of the large and protected Russian market34 and the Polish-German trade 
war of 1925. The currency stabilization in 1923 further negatively affected the international com-
petitiveness of Polish products (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985, p. 77), while another great shock 
was hyperinflation.35 Generally speaking, the post-war situation worldwide signified altogether a 
new page in the distributional history in comparison to the pre-WW1 political and social setting 
(e.g., Piketty 2014, Scheve and Stasavage 2016, Milanović 2016, Scheidel 2017).  
The following six years, however, saw a continuous rise in the top percentile share and reached 
almost 11 per cent in 1930. The economy eventually stabilised in 1926, and the country experi-
enced three years of steady growth, halted only by the advent of the Great Depression in 1929. The 
economic recovery brought better prospects for top incomes, which experienced an immediate 
improvement in 1926.36 One important external event was the strike of British miners in 1926, 
31
 For example, German army transferred complete factories from Łódź to Germany (Davies 2005, p. 130). 
32
 The top marginal rate of the income tax had equaled 5% in pre-WW1 Austria and 4% in Prussia (while in Russia 
the income tax had never been introduced). In contrast, the top marginal rate on rate in interwar Poland was 40% on 
unearned income and 25% on earned income. 
33
 The cabinet of the Prime Minister Władysław Grabski (1923-1925) launched a whole set of stabilization policies 
placing the largest burden of their financing on the wealthy. 
34
 It was especially the industry of the former Russian partition, which exported as much as 90 per cent of its products 
to Russia before WWI (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985, Tab. 1.1, 1.2). The Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1920 further 
disrupted the industrial production and broke the supply chains (Landau and Tomaszewski 1984).
35
 However, there has been surprisingly little research done on the distributional effects of the Polish hyperinflation, 
and its effects remain ambiguous (in particular between the post-war creeping inflation and the hyperinflation of 
1923/4). As an exception see Van Thadden (1995), who sees Polish inflation as beneficial to the post-war reconstruc-
tion via redistribution of wealth towards industrialists, first from wage earners (1918-21) and then from agriculture 
(1921-23) (1995, pp.116-17). 
36
 The consensus of historians has been that the May coup in 1926 was not motivated by the class struggle (Landau 
1978), in line with Piłsudski’s general disinterest with economic affairs. 
20 
leading to the rise in coal prices, which stimulated Polish coal exports. Figure 3 shows the evolu-
tion of the average income of three top income groups constituting the top percentile together with 
the total average income during the interwar period. It can be seen that the period between 1926 
and 1929 was characterised by the substantial increase in top income shares which outstripped the 
overall income rise. While the economic growth saw an improvement of conditions for all income 
groups, the rich benefited proportionally more (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985, p. 81).  
However, when the tax data become available in 1935, the series on top income shares re-emerge 
at 15 per cent, which corresponds to its secular peak in the time of peace. All top income groups 
saw rising shares in this period, suggesting a rising dispersion between the top and the rest of the 
distribution (e.g. P0-99), rather than within top income groups (see Table A2). Accordingly, it is 
plausible that this development indicates a deteriorating position of Polish farmers relative to other 
social groups. Almost two-thirds of the population was made of small farmers and peasants and it 
was agriculture that was most adversely affected by the Great Depression, in the first place due to 
a strong fall in agricultural prices. In contrast, the fall in industrial prices was much less steep due 
to rapid cartelization, which safeguarded industrial profits at the top.37 For example, prices of ag-
ricultural products in 1935 were only 33 per cent of their 1928 level, those of industrial goods were 
57 per cent, while prices of cartelized products stood at 82 per cent (Landau and Tomaszewski 
1985, Tab. 2.6). Consequently, between 1929 and 1934, the rural population’s share in national 
income fell from 46.7 to 39.5 per cent (Landau 1963, p. 37). The deflationary trend was, on the 
other hand, beneficial to high-salaried employees that were able to keep their job due to rigid 
salaries, making this group relative winner behind this development (Landau 1933). Kalecki and 
Landau (1935, p. 450) estimated that between 1929 and 1933 incomes of blue-collar workers 
halved, while incomes of white-collar workers fell by 30 per cent.38  
As can be seen in Figure 3, the Great Depression led to differential income fall for different top 
groups. The top 0.1 per cent saw a proportionally stronger fall at the start of the crisis (1929-1931) 
than the lower groups in the top percentile – following on the higher relative growth of the top 0.1 
37 Rough estimates indicate that cartels controlled more than a half of the industrial output in the 1930s (Landau 1978).
38
 This is obvious if we take those recently unemployed as having zero wage income. For those that kept their job, we 
observe stability in wage distribution (see Figure 8 below), which is an additional argument for wage rigidity. 
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in the late 1920s. Yet, in 1935 (unfortunately, there is no data for three years after 1931) we find 
that top groups had managed to retain its relative standing, coming out from the crisis unscratched. 
On the other hand, the average nominal income (P0-100) almost halved in the decade after 1925. 
The real mean income of top groups actually increased strongly during the crisis. Plausibly, the 
rapid cartelization should be identified as the main tool allowing top incomes to steer the crisis 
successfully, and the main beneficiaries should be searched among the capital income recipients, 
as we look next. 
Figure 4 shows the composition of top income groups in 1929 between earnings and other sources 
of income (defined in the tax statistics as ‘unearned’ income, roughly corresponding to the broad 
definition of capital income). Groups below the top percentile, such as the top 5-1 per cent, were 
dominantly composed of earnings. The importance of earnings, however, decreases with income 
rank. For the top 0.1 per cent group, for example, unearned income made as much as 80 per cent 
of the income, while earnings accounted for only 20 per cent of the total income. Although the 
proportion of earnings increased for top groups during the Great Depression (Figure A7) – thus 
confirming our hypothesis that top salaries relatively benefited in the depression – top incomes 
still predominantly derived the bulk of their income from other-than-employment activities.  
Further insights could be obtained by looking at the spatial distribution of county-level top income 
shares in Poland.39 Figure 5 presents the map of Polish counties in 1927 and county-level top 1% 
income shares (using county control population and total county income). The dashed line marks 
the former borders between the partitions. The geographic distribution of top income shares has a 
donut-shape, with high levels at the edges of the interwar Poland and relatively low in the centre. 
The largest inequalities are in the former Prussian Partition (the west) and the eastern parts of the 
former Russian Partition (the east). The picture is less clear for the former Austrian Partition (the 
south and south-eastern parts), where there are no clusters of counties with high top income shares. 
Figure 6 displays a contribution of each county to the aggregate top 1% income. The map is almost 
a reverse of the previous one. The most developed counties from Silesia and the core of the former 
Russian Partition (Warszawa, Łódź) contribute the most to the aggregated top incomes. At the 
same time, these regions show comparatively lower top income shares. To shed light on the 
39 The details of the data and methodology can be found in Appendixes 1.4 and 3. 
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formation of inequality in Interwar Poland, in Appendix A.3 we use the cross-section of county-
level data to regress top 1% income share on a rich set of variables, including urbanization, 
employment structure and land inequality. We find that correlations between these measures and 
inequality is heterogeneous across the former partitions. In the former Prussian partition, the top 
income shares are more connected with agrarian capitalism than with classic industrialization or 
urbanization.40 Similarly in the former Russian partition, but the correlations are weaker. On the 
other hand, in the former Austrian partition top income shares are positively correlated with 
urbanization, negatively correlated with the measure of agrarian capitalism and do not seem to be 
related to the level of industrialization.  
3.3. World War II and the Communist accession to power 
Right after the Second World War, in 1946-7, we find top income shares at the level of 9 per cent 
– a significant fall from the level of 14.6 per cent in 1936 (Figure 1). In order to understand the
fall in top shares one needs again to ascertain a development at the ‘bottom’ of the distribution. 
The post-WW2 years saw thus a relative improvement in the living conditions of the rural 
population in comparison to the devastating experience of the Great Depression. This came about 
in the first place through rising prices of agricultural products, the large land redistribution, debt 
release and the new social legislation, such as the increased availability of education in the 
countryside (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985). In fact, the German occupation already brought 
about changes in the distribution of national income in favour of the rural population, primarily 
through the “reversal of price scissors” (ibid., p. 175).41 
40
 We measure agrarian capitalism as the share of agriculture workers in the total population; and industrialization as 
the share of industry workers in the total population. 
41
 Of course, this relative improvement should not mislead us in idealizing the position of rural population during the 
occupation. But, the rise in prices of farm products allowed certain surplus that implied a notable amelioration of 
farmers’ living standard in comparison to the 1930s. Further, Nazis also took measures in earnings equalisation, which 
basically implied a common immiseration and exploitation of all urban strata. Through the reduction of the skill dif-
ferential, the Nazis also wanted to ensure higher accumulation funds (a policy later pursued by communists). The only 
evidence of top income patterns during the German Occupation is for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (No-
vokmet 2018), pointing to a sharp rise of very top income shares (top 1% share and above), which was driven by a 
strong increase in top business profits. At the same time, however, there was a fall in shares of ‘lower’ top groups 
(such as top 10-1%) predominantly made of employment income due to sharp earnings equalizations pursued by the 
Nazis (Novokmet 2018; see also Nikolić and Novokmet 2018 on evidence of earnings equalizations in the Protec-
torate). 
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Figure 3 : Evolution of average income of groups within the top percentile 
Source: authors’ computations based on the income tax data.  
Figure 4: The composition of the top 5 per cent, Poland in 1929 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics and Wiśniewski (1934). 
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Figure 5: County-level top 1% income share 
Source: authors’ computation (see Appendixes 1.4 and 3). 
Figure 6: County-level contribution to the aggregate top 1% income. 
Source: authors’ computation (see Appendixes 1.4 and 3). 
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The tax data for the post-WW2 years, however, do not point to the dramatic deconcentration within 
the top groups. Tabulations for ‘unearned’ income were published in first years after the Second 
World War (1945, 1946 and 1947). 42  Figure 7 compares the shape of the upper tail of the 
distribution of unearned income before and after the Second World War by looking at the ratio of 
average income above the given threshold to that threshold. This concentration measure is useful 
for comparative purposes as it does not depend on changing income levels through time. Note that 
higher ratio implies higher concentration at the top, while it is constant if the distribution assumes 
the Paretian form (inverted Pareto coefficient b). The figure presents roughly 200 thousand top 
taxpayers obtaining unearned income in 1936, 1946 and 1947.43 The top concentration before the 
war is quite similar to that observed immediately after the war. It seems that the war and the 
occupation, as well as the immediate effects of the introduction of communism, did not 
dramatically affect top concentration patterns.44  
But it is indisputable that a fall in concentration of unearned income occurred eventually as 
communist strengthened the rule in the country, which led to an almost complete expropriation of 
capital income by the state. The turning point was 1947 when the most radical legislation in the 
direction of nationalisation was passed. The employment in the nationalised sector accounted for 
87% of the total (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985, p.199). In the succeeding years, during the so-
called Battle for Trade (Bitwa o handel), even the majority of small shops and crafts were 
nationalised. Private income was almost exclusively allowed in the smallholding agriculture. 
Unsurprisingly, 1947 is the last year for which tax tabulations are available. The next decisive 
episode was the currency reform in 1950 that virtually confiscated all personal financial wealth. 
42 However, both physical and legal persons are grouped, without providing separate presentations as before the war. 
Yet, we argue that the picture corresponds mostly to physical persons. Only private entities were taxed and most legal 
big (joint-stock) companies in Poland were nationalised immediately after the war.
43 It should be noted that comparison is not perfect, as clearly cumulative frequencies do not correspond to same shares 
of population (in particular, due to the huge human casualties).
44
 Note that this would be in accord with initial speculations of Pareto (1896), as it would suggest unchanging character 
of inequality, not depending on markedly different political and institutional arrangements. 
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Figure 7: Inverted Pareto coefficient b for ‘unearned’ income 
Source: authors’ computation from income tax statistics 
Note: dots on lines present the number of cumulated taxpayers above the specific bracket threshold. 
3.4. Communist Poland 
In theory, the distribution of income under a socialist state should be based on the rule “from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his labour” (Marx 1875; Atkinson and Micklewright 
1992). The rule does not imply an inequality-free society, even in the model version of socialism. 
More important from our standpoint is the abolition of the private ownership of the means of 
production. As capital ownership is generally very concentrated (Piketty 2014), nationalisation of 
business capital should inevitably lead to the more egalitarian distribution of income. At the same 
time, labour income and wage setting process become the main determinants of inequalities in a 
socialist society. The wage setting process was mainly centralised, with a limited role of incentive 
schemes. The wage structure across occupations/positions was used as a policy tool, for instance, 
to provide incentives for people to invest in particular skills, to stimulate the economy by widening 
earnings differentials or to calm down social dissatisfaction by narrowing them (Flakierski 1986; 
Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). In addition, bonuses were given to establishments, which 
performance was higher than expected. In practice, however, the wage levels were often more 
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
1,00010,000100,000
In
ve
rte
d 
Pa
re
to
 c
o
e
ffi
ci
e
nt
 
b
Cumulative taxpayers
1936
1946
1947
27 
dependent on the political power of workers, managers and industry groups than on productivity 
(Brus 1974).  
Figure 1 depicts the top 1% income shares during the communist period (see Appendix A.1.5 for 
more details on the methodology). As noted before, the top labour income approximates the total 
top income, because in the socialist economy the private income from capital was almost 
completely eliminated.45 The inequalities slightly trended downward from 4.9% in 1956 to 3.4% 
in 1988, and the average level in this period is roughly half of the total top income shares in 1946 
or 1992.  
Figure 8 presents the upper part of the earnings distribution, showing the evolution of 90th and 
95th percentile (expressed as a proportion to median) from the late 1920s until today. The evolu-
tion of wage ratios is more volatile than the top income share, yet the relative levels and trend are 
similar. It can be clearly seen that the top earnings concentration was substantially lower during 
communism than in the interwar period. Kalecki (1964) and Beskid (1963, 1964) show that earn-
ings compression was primarily caused by a decline in premium between white-collar and blue-
collar workers.46 Landau and Tomaszewski (1985, p. 211) note that “salaries […] were much 
lower than before 1939, whereas the wages of lowest paid labourers grew considerably.” The fast 
industrialisation and urbanisation significantly improved living conditions of low and middle-in-
come workers. In subsequent decades, the communist government used institutional factors, such 
as unionisation or centrally determined wages and prices, to control real wages.47  
45
 Most agriculture remained in private hands, yet it was heavily constrained by the small maximum holding size and 
the maximum number of employees allowed. The published labour income also misses certain privileges of the po-
litical elite, e,g. access to high-quality housing or shops.  
46 This pattern was already induced by Nazis during the occupation in their attempts to maximise exploitation of the 
Polish labour force by setting their real wages below the subsistence level.
47
 Finally, communists affected another fundamental aspect of inequality, that of inequality in status. It is impossible 
to quantify this aspect, but it is conceivably one that was essential in shaping the social reality of Poland. Plausibly, 
these stark inequalities could be responsible for the pervasive anti-democratic elements in the political culture of 
Poland before WWII. This is actually the role that Dahrendorf (1968) attributed to Nazis in Germany, who made a 
sharp break with the (‘anti-modern’) forces in the German society – and (unintentionally) made possible, after their 
fall, an easier building of democratic society. Ironically, it required radical totalitarian forces in Central Europe to 
break the fetters of the past. Piatkowski (2018) has recently advanced a kindred view on the role of communism in 
Poland. 
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Figure 8: The upper part of earnings distribution in Poland (90th and 95th percentile as 
proportion of median) 
Source: own construction: 1929-1949; 2008-2014; other years: Atkinson and Micklewright 1992; Rutkowski 2001; 
Atkinson 2008; (see Appendix A.4); Note: 1955-1989: gross monthly wage for employees in socialized sector (1970-
1988 net monthly wage); 1929-1949 gross weekly wage in industry for manual workers. 
The first mechanism was the extent of unionization of blue-collar workers. During the early years 
of communism, exceptional power was given to the high-level managers and the workers’ 
representation was weak, which increased within-firm wage dispersion (Brus 1974). The popular 
dissatisfaction was growing and culminated in massive and violent protests of workers in Poznań 
in June 1956. The Party leadership, fearing the potential country-wide revolution, introduced a set 
of reforms improving workers representation. The move towards semi-independent unions is 
marked by the decline in the wage decile ratios after 1956. Notably, the P95/P50 ratio falls more 
abruptly than the P90/P50, possibly owing to the decline of the power of the high-level 
management. Giving too much power to unions, however, was also threatening the position of the 
communist government. The “thaw” of 1956 ended in the early 1960s, when the Party turned 
towards more centralised economy and scraped the independence of workers’ bodies, leading to a 
period of modest growth in the wage dispersion.  
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The second mechanism was the connection between worker’s performance and wages.  A low 
labour productivity was a plague of the socialist economy in the 1960s (Flakierski 1986). The 
Party reacted in the early 1970s, with a set of limited marketization reforms, which would increase 
worker’s incentives by directly linking their wages with the output. It is hard to assess whether this 
policy had any effect on productivity, as it was also a period of foreign loan-financed consumption 
growth. What can be seen, however, is that wage inequality entered a decade of continuous growth, 
driven by the growth of within-industry dispersion and to a lesser extent by a shift in industry 
composition (Flakierski 1986). 
The loan-financed economic growth resulted in a profound economic crisis, substantial fall in real 
wages and growing popular dissatisfaction. The communists reacted by directly controlling the 
wage dispersion. The massive protests and emergence of the “Solidarność” movement in 1980, 
coincide thus with a remarkable fall in the wage ratios (Flakierski 1986; Atkinson and 
Micklewright 1992).48 Yet, the communists did not manage to stop the new democratic movement 
and, in 1989, they were forced to organise the first (partially) free elections in the socialist block. 
The landslide victory of “Solidarność” is a symbolic end of the communist rules in Poland. 
4. The Full Distribution of Income in Poland, 1983-2015
In this section we present the evolution of the full income distribution in Poland during the transi-
tion from communism to market economy. Our new series on the evolution of income inequality 
in Poland show that official survey-based measures strongly underestimate the level of income 
inequality in Poland. In the same manner, our results suggest a notably higher increase in income 
inequality in Poland since the end of communism until today.  
The largest increase in income inequality occurred in the early 1990s, particularly between 1993 
and 1995. The top 10% income share increased from levels around 22-23% in the 1980s to 25% 
in 1992-1993, and then jumped to 30% by 1995 (Figure 2). This rise was accompanied by a fall in 
income shares of the middle 40% and of the bottom 50%. These groups experienced a roughly 
48
 The same authors also point that the drop in wage ratios could be a result of the poor data quality and collection, 
inevitable during the Martial Law (1981-83). 
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commensurate fall in income shares of around 5 percentage points between 1989 and 1995. 
Subsequently, we observe a steady rise in inequality, especially between 2003 and 2008, which 
has been also induced by the rising share of the top decile. 
It is important to note that this rise has been altogether overlooked by the official survey-based 
measures (Figure 9). Between 1989 and 2015, the top 10% income share rose from levels slightly 
above 20% in the 1980s up to 35% in 2015, as opposed to around 26% suggested by surveys. In 
the same period, the top 1% income share more than tripled, rising from around 4% to 13%, as 
opposed to 6% suggested by surveys (Figure A8). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the 
comparison of Gini coefficients (Figure A9). Overall, these results show the importance of 
correcting the upper end of the distribution in the survey data. 
We next consider distributional effects of the transition in Poland by looking at the growth expe-
rience of different income groups. Over the 1989-2015 period, average real national income per 
adult has increased by 73%, or at about 2.1% per year.49 Overall, there has been a notable increase 
in the living standards of the Polish population since the fall of Communism (especially when the 
grave stagnation of the 1980s is taken into account). However, this growth has not been equally 
shared. Table 2 shows that real incomes of the top 10% increased by 190% (or 4.2% per year) and 
of the top percentile by 458% (or 6.8% per year). On the other hand, the income growth of the 
bottom 90% has been much more modest: the bottom 50% experienced a 31% increase (1% per 
year) and the middle 40% a 47% increase (1.5% per year) in their real income. The finding that 
real incomes of the Polish bottom 50% have increased, but at the relatively lower rates, is con-
sistent with the finding of Milanović and Ersado (2012) that in the former transition countries 
growth has been disequalizing in relative but not in absolute terms. Table 2 also shows that the top 
1% has captured almost twice as large portion of the total income growth as compared to the bot-
tom 50% group (24% versus 13%, respectively).  
49
 If we take for the starting the year 1991, which is the low point of the transition recession, then the average real 
growth per adult has increased by 115%, or at about 3.2% per year. The source on real growth per adult is World 
Wealth and Income Database (WID). 
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Figure 9: Top 10% Incomes Share in Poland, 1983-2015 
Source: Authors’ computation. Survey estimates based on HBS (see section 2). Distribution of pre-tax national income 
(before taxes and transfers, except pensions and unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults 
Table 2: Income growth and inequality in Poland 1989-2015 
Income group 
(distribution of pre-tax na-
tional income) 
Average annual 
real growth rate 
1989-2015 
Total cumulated 
real growth 
1989-2015 
Share in total 
macro growth 
1989-2016 
Full Population 2.1% 73% 100% 
Bottom 50% 1.0% 31% 13% 
Middle 40% 1.5% 47% 30% 
Top 10%  4.2% 190% 57% 
Top 1% 6.8% 458% 24% 
Top 0.1% 9.7% 1019% 9% 
Top 0.01% 13.0% 2273% 3% 
Top 0.001% 16.4% 5066% 1% 
Source: Authors’ computation (see section 2). Distribution of pre-tax national income (before taxes and transfers, 
except pensions and unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults 
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4.1. Accounting for the rise of inequality after 1989 
Rising earnings dispersion has been commonly identified as the main cause of rising income 
inequality in Central Eastern European countries during the first years of transition (Milanović 
1999; Flemming and Micklewright 2000; Mitra and Yemstov 2006). Even though the share of 
wages in the total income dropped, rising wage concentration has spurred the overall inequality 
increase (Milanović 1999, Rutkowski 2001).50 The rise of earnings dispersion at the top in Poland 
can be clearly seen in Figure 8 above. The rising educational premium, triggered by the 
decentralisation of wage setting process, has been usually singled out as the main cause of rising 
wage inequality in Poland (e.g. Rutkowski 2001, Keane and Prasad 2006, Letki et al. 2014).  
On the other hand, Keane and Prasad (2002) find that a marked increase in social transfers during 
first transition years played the key role in mitigating the sharp rise in inequality in Poland (as 
inequality of pre-transfer market income sharply increased).   This is visible in a more robust rel-
ative standing of the Polish bottom 50% in the 1990s. In particular, the extensive transfer system 
aimed to compensate potential ‘losers’ from the market reform, providing on larger scale an access 
to early retirement to older workers and unemployed, generous unemployment benefits, disability 
benefits, etc. (Brzeziński et al., 2013, p. 92; Lindert 2004).51 Moreover, Keane and Prasad (2000, 
p. 4) have argued that these social policies ensured the social stability and consequently provided 
the general political support for the market reforms and enterprise restructuring in Poland (Figure 
A10).52 
50
 Several theories have been offered aiming to explain earnings dispersion in Poland and other transition countries. 
Thus, Milanović (1999) has proposed that a rise in earnings inequality in transition was induced by a shift of workers 
from the wage compressed state sector to the more wage-dispersed private sector. In this respect Rutkowski (2001, p. 
18) confirms that the higher incidence of both high-paying and low paying jobs in Poland is more characteristic for
the private sector. However, Keane and Prasad (2006) indicate that the reallocation mechanism was of secondary 
importance in Poland since earnings dispersion took place both within the public and the private sector, and thus 
within-sector inequalities were the dominant force behind the overall delevelling trend. 
51
 As a result, social spending substantially increased between 1990 and 1992. However, the rising deficit precluded 
further increase in social spending in subsequent years, and the fact that inequality increased more substantially exactly 
after 1993, might be taken, according to Keane and Prasad (2000, p. 21), as an additional evidence of the effectiveness 
of social transfers in mitigating the sharp rise in inequality between 1990 and 1993. 
52
 Figure A10 shows that the share of transfers in the total household income from HBS sharply increased from 18% 
in 1986 to 25% in 1995, and to 33% in 1995. The share of transfers in the bottom 50% income increased from 37% in 
1986 to 50% in 1995, while for the middle 40% from 11% in 1986 to 31% in 1995. One further sees that the greatest 
increase in the transfers for the bottom 50% occurred until 1992, while for the middle 40% between 1992 and 1995. 
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The recent rise in inequality in Poland has been again driven by the increase in top income shares. 
The top 10% share has steadily increased since the early 2000s and has reached levels around 35% 
by 2015 (Figure 2). To understand better this development, we turn to the income composition for 
top groups. Figure 10 shows that higher top income groups have been mostly composed of business 
income, while earnings have dominated for lower top groups constituting the top decile, such as 
the top 10-1 per cent. Business income clearly combines both the capital and the labour 
component,53 but in the Polish context, it is plausible that business income at the top reflects in 
large part the return to capital (Kopczuk 2012; Alstadsæter et al. 2017; see section 2.2.).54  
A robust rise in top business incomes after 2004 was the main reason behind the structural rise in 
top income shares. This also calls for a more detailed study of the effect of factor shares (Figure 
11). The period after the EU accession has been associated with capital deepening (see Gradzewicz 
et al. 2014) and rising capital share (falling labour share) (Growiec 2012). With the top 1 percent 
income group holding almost two-thirds of the total business income reported to the tax 
administration, any notable change in the functional distribution towards capital could result in 
rising top concentration.55  
53 For example, the tax statistics mingles here both the owners of large unincorporated businesses and self-employed 
individuals mostly deriving income from their human capital.  
54
 Unincorporated enterprises are quite frequent business types in Poland, often including those with substantial capital 
(Johnson 1994, p. 265). Kopczuk (2012, p. 6) points in addition that benefits of incorporated organizations such as 
limited liability can still be in practice combined with personal income taxation under business income. Accordingly, 
Alstadsæter et al. (2017, Table 1) show that Poland has by far the highest share of employment in ‘pass-through’ 
entities in Europe. On the other hand, corporations distributing profits in the form of dividends are less frequent, 
predominantly in foreign-owned enterprises (see Figure A11). In the recent study, Smith et al. (2019) attribute three-
quarters of private business profit (from ‘pass-through’ businesses) in the United States as human capital income. 
Besides the inexactness of these estimates, one needs to point to cross-country differences in corporate legislation and 
practices (e.g. see La Porta et al. 1997). Accordingly, Poland resembles more central European countries, such as 
Germany or Italy, where many large businesses are of the unincorporated form (Dell 2007, Bach et al. 2009). 
55
 For general interpersonal inequality to grow with the rise of aggregate capital share, capital income should in general 
be more unequally distributed that labour income (Atkinson 2009; Atkinson and Bourguignon 2000; Glyn 2009; Mi-
lanović 2015). A substantial number of works finds significant relationship between factor shares and inequality either 
for single countries or in cross-country samples (e.g. Bengtsson and Waldenström 2018; Ryan 1996; Schlenker and 
Schmid 2013; Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa 2010). 
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Before looking at the potential explanations for the concurrent increase in the capital share and top 
income shares, one should first bear in mind that since 2004 business income can be taxed sepa-
rately using a flat tax rate, which was beneficial for high-income individuals56 and might have 
induced increased reporting of business income to tax administration.57 On the one hand, the rise 
of top business incomes might have been an outcome of lower tax avoidance and evasion (Kopczuk 
2012), on the other, an outcome of shifting of high earnings to business income (e.g. Gordon and 
Slemrod 2000). Although the reform probably did have material effects,58 we believe that it is not 
the whole story. In the on-going work, we use the registry database on individual-level tax returns 
in an attempt to empirically disentangle the rise of business income due to the real activity and 
‘reporting’ effects (Bukowski et al. 2019).  
The rise in capital share has been often attributed to the new globalization phase and increasing 
participation in the international trade. We point to three broad channels how globalization might 
have potentially induced the rising capital share in Poland. The first channel is the capital-aug-
menting technological change, which has entered Poland through strong foreign direct investment 
(FDI) after the EU accession (Olszewski 2009). The attractiveness of technology argument lies in 
the fact that it can account in addition for increasing returns to skills, as recorded in rising wage 
inequality (e.g. Krusell et al. 2000). The second channel is a trade-induced shift towards capital-
intensive sectors. Traditional labour-intensive industries, such as mining or textile manufacturing, 
have been in decline due to the increasing trade competition, especially after China joined the 
WTO in 2001 (Growiec 2012; Balsvik et al. 2015). Finally, being a part of the global value chains, 
foreign investors or Polish multinational companies do not build a supply chain in Poland, which 
can break the connection between the productivity of the company and the domestic demand for 
labour (Timmer et al. 2014; Baldwin 2016). Trade-involved companies are facing thus relatively 
56
 Before 2003 taxpayers reporting business income were taxed using the general progressive scheme, with three 
brackets with marginal tax rates of 19%, 30% and 40%. After the reform, they gained an option of reporting business 
income using the flat rate of 19%.
57
 For example, should we interpret a strong fall in the top percentile share in 2003 as well as its immediate upswing 
in the following year partly in the light of this word of caution? Since the reform was introduced in November 2003 
and it was widely discussed before (e.g. Antaczak 2003), there was an incentive for business owners to postpone 
income for 2004 instead of 2003. This would be generally in line with recent findings that a prompt response to tax 
incentives has been mostly a practice of the very high-income individuals, who show much higher overall elasticity 
of taxable income (Gruber and Saez 2002; Saez 2004). 
58
 Kopczuk (2012) estimates very high elasticity of taxable income to the marginal tax rate change, close to one, which 
is among the highest documented in the literature.  
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weak upward pressure on their own wages even though they earn higher profit margins. Relatedly, 
the rising market power of foreign companies over labour could have also contributed to the falling 
labour share, as a monopsonistic firm might pay its employers wages below competitive levels 
(Azar et al. 2017; Benmelech et al. 2018). 
The distributional effects of globalization and technological change can also explain a decline in 
the income share of the middle 40% (Figure 2), which can be attributed to the relative standing of 
the Polish middle class. It has been documented that the middle-skilled jobs in developed econo-
mies have been more likely to be automatized, leading to so called ‘job polarization’ (Autor et al 
2006). At the same time, employment in manufacturing – a traditional sector of middle class – has 
been in decline due to offshoring and trade competition with developing countries (Autor et al 
2016).59 The relative fall in the importance of middle class, which is the ‘back-bone’ of democ-
racy, might be related to the recent rise of populism across the CEE and Western European coun-
tries.  
59
 According to the EU-KLEMS data, the share of value added attributed to manufacturing has increased from 18% 
in 2000 to 20% in 2015, but the share of employment has declined from 26% to 23% over the same period. 
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. 
Figure 10: Top 1 per cent and Top 5-1 per cent income decomposition between business and 
labour income  
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics; Distribution of fiscal income among tax units. Note: 
labour income includes: income from employment, pensions, as well as other non-business income sources.  
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Figure 11: The evolution of capital share in gross value added of non-financial corporations 
and the top 1 per cent income share, Poland 1995-2013 
Source: Capital share: Polish National Accounts; Eurostat. Top 1% income share: authors’ computation based on 
income tax statistics. Distribution of fiscal income among tax units Note: capital income is calculated as 80 per cent 
of gross operating surplus in non-financial corporations. Capital share is the proportion of thus obtained capital income 
in factor-cost gross value added of non-financial corporations. We take 80 percent of gross operating surplus since 
Polish National Accounts place unincorporated enterprises with more than 10 employees in non-financial sector, and 
we assume that the part of its operating surplus should be attributed to labour income of owners and household mem-
bers. The obtained estimates of capital share in GVA are consistent with those of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). 
5. International Comparison
We next turn to international comparisons. First, we compare the long-run evolution of income 
inequality in Poland and Western European countries. Figure 12 shows the evolution of the top 1 
per cent share in Poland, Germany, France, Sweden and the UK between 1914 and 2014. Although 
a broad U-shaped pattern can be observed in all countries throughout the 20th century, it has been 
especially pronounced in Poland. The period between 1914 and 1945 initiated a secular downward 
inequality trend worldwide due to wars, political and economic shocks. While WW1 itself was 
advantageous to top incomes in presented countries, the immediate post-war development hit hard 
top incomes – with a decline particularly pronounced in Poland. It is now well documented that 
the evolution of top income shares in developed countries during the first half of the 20th century 
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reveals the fate of top capital incomes (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010; Piketty 2014; Atkinson 
2015). In Poland, although industrial and financial capital suffered even more in comparison to 
other countries, there was a rise in top shares during the Great Depression due to the deterioration 
of Polish farmers’ income relative to top incomes composed dominantly of non-agricultural 
groups.60 Interestingly, top percentile share in Germany saw an increase of a similar magnitude in 
the 1930s, while top shares in other countries experienced a steady decline between the two wars.61 
While inequality stood at low levels in all countries in the three post-WW2 decades, the 
introduction of communism dramatically reduced top income shares in Poland and kept them 
below the levels observed in western European countries. With the fall of communism, the top 
percentile share substantially increased in Poland from 1989 to 2015, to reach the levels 
characteristic for more unequal European countries, notably the UK and Germany, and placed 
Poland significantly above estimates for the group of Continental, Nordic and Southern European 
countries (e.g. Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011). 
It is interesting to point to the recent similar evolution of the Polish top percentile income share 
and that documented in Germany and the UK. In all three countries, the evolution of top incomes 
has exhibited a strong pro-cyclical character. As we discussed before, it seems that Polish top 
incomes follow more closely macroeconomic conditions due to the relatively high concentration 
of business income, which generally displays more pro-cyclical character. In addition, economies 
in Central Europe are especially sensitive to economic developments in Germany, which is their 
largest trading partner and direct investor.62 For instance, an increasing participation of Poland in 
German-led global value chains (GVC) might have also contributed to the synchronization of top 
shares in two countries (Figure A12). 
60
 Or to put it alternatively, income of top groups fell less than for the rest of the population dominantly made of 
farmers. 
61
 Top capital incomes in Germany recovered from Weimar shocks during the Nazi state economy amid growing war 
preparations (Dell 2007), while, for example, in Sweden, they were adversely affected due to the Depression shocks 
such as the well-known Kreuger crash (Roine and Waldenström 2010). 
62
 Germany is by far the most important Poland’s trading partner, for example, being a destination for almost a third 
of total Polish exports. In this respect, the UK comes second in importance, receiving slightly less than 10 percent of 
total Polish exports. 
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Further, it is of particular interest to compare the experience of Poland to that of other ex-com-
munist countries in Eastern Europe. Figure 13 shows that all countries for which we have historical 
inequality series – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Russia – have displayed a marked 
U-shaped evolution of top income shares in the long-run (Mavridis and Mosberger 2017; Novok-
met 2018; Novokmet et al. 2018a). It can be seen that the introduction of communism sharply 
reduced top income shares in all countries. However, the return to the market economy saw quite 
divergent development of inequality in Russia in comparison to countries in Central Eastern Eu-
rope. The top percentile share in Russia surged to levels around 20 per cent, while in the latter 
countries it stabilised at levels between 9-14 per cent – with Poland at the upper end of the spec-
trum and the Czech Republic and Hungary at the lower end. We speculate that higher income 
concentration in Poland than in other former socialist countries in EU could be linked to relatively 
higher number of affluent entrepreneurs, plausibly benefiting from the larger domestic market. 
The available series on the entire income distribution for the recent decades provides us with richer 
insight into the post-communist distributional dynamics in international comparison. Figure 14 
and Figure 15 show the evolution of the bottom 50% and the top 10% income share, respectively, 
in Poland, Russia, China and France from 1980 until 2015. It is particularly interesting to compare 
the evolution of income inequality in Poland and Russia after the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe. While income inequality was similar in both countries in the 1980s (Atkinson and Mick-
lewright 1992; Flemming and Micklewright 2000) – slightly below 0.3 as measured by the Gini 
coefficient – the beginning of the transition to the market economy led to markedly divergent 
inequality trajectories. A critical divergence took place between 1991 and 1995/6, when Gini index 
in Russia surged to levels around 0.6, while in Poland it increased to ‘only’ 0.4. In this respect, the 
contrasting development of the bottom 50% income shares in Russia and Poland is particularly 
striking (Figure 14). The bottom 50% share was around 30% of national income in both countries 
in the 1980s. But, while the bottom 50% share in Russia more than halved between 1991 and 1996, 
its Polish counterpart experienced a relatively moderate decline during the same period – from 
30% to 25% of national income. More extensive and better targeted social transfers toward low-
income groups in Poland have been seen as the most important mechanism in precluding a sharp 
rise of inequality during the transition (Keane and Prasad 2002; Mitra and Yemtsov 2006). Trans-
fer payments in Russia were small and declining, and a collapse in living standards of the bottom 
40 
50% led to a sharp increase in inequality in the early 1990s. Subsequently, the bottom 50% income 
share in Poland has moderately declined to levels slightly above 20% in recent years, characteristic 
for continental European countries, such as France (Figure 14). 
The critical divergence occurred concurrently at the upper part of the distribution. The post-com-
munist transformation has resulted in markedly higher top income and wealth concentration in 
Russia than in Poland and other ex-communist. The decoupling had already occurred by 1996, 
when top 10% income share in Poland reached levels slightly above 30%, while in Russia it surged 
to almost 50% (Figure 15). In particular, top-end income concentration is markedly higher in Rus-
sia than in Poland (Figure 13). This is in line with the Forbes billionaire data, which show a dis-
proportionally high billionaire wealth in Russia (Novokmet et al. 2018).63 The timing of the diver-
gence in top shares from the mid-1990s could be related to the ownership consolidation following 
the mass privatization in Russia in the environment of legislative and institutional vacuum favour-
ing the rich (Guriev and Rachinsky 2008).64 Broadly speaking, different privatization strategies 
pursued – ‘big-bang’ in Russia versus more gradual in Poland – have been often highlighted as an 
important source of the documented divergence of income and wealth inequality trajectories in 
two countries.65 The other factors might have mattered as well. The abundance of natural resource 
rents in Russia (their lack in Poland) has plausibly contributed to markedly higher concentration 
levels in Russia. On the other hand, it has been often argued that institutional framework, more 
63
 Brzeziński (2017, p. 7) reports much smaller wealth of the Polish billionaires in the Forbes data, equivalent to only 
1.3% of Poland’s GDP in 2016. In contrast, the wealth of Russian billionaires on the Forbes list has been around 30%-
40% of national income in the last decade (Novokmet et al 2018, Fig. 2). 
64
 Guriev and Rachinsky (2008, p. 142) have referred to this as the ‘institutional economies of scale’, where “large 
owners were able to influence rules of the game from capturing regulators, courts and legislatures”. Importantly, as 
these authors further note (fn. 13), widespread wage arrears compelled many workers to sell their shares (from voucher 
privatization) at very low prices. As a result, a plunge in the Russian bottom 50% was directly related to the high rise 
in top income shares. 
65
 In general, the economic theory on wealth accumulation is of little help in explaining how self-made fortunes are 
created (Davies and Shorrocks 2000, p. 628). One should consider the privatization channel as one important source 
of large entrepreneurial wealth. The creation of new enterprises in Poland had been closely linked to the liquidation 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). One of the characteristic features of the Polish privatization program was that 
liquidation of SOEs, followed by the private acquisition of capital assets of liquidated companies, was quite wide-
spread form of disposing public capital (rather than by prolonged mass privatization) (Kolodko and Nuti 1997, T.5; 
Krajewski and Piasecki 1999). The additional privatization channel contributing to the rise of SMEs was the so-called 
‘leasing’, according to which private enterprises could lease a part or the whole SOEs intended as restructuring/liqui-
dating measure, with the future prospect of buying the leased property (Uvalic 2003; Kolodko and Nuti 1997). More-
over, it seems that ownership transfer in Poland largely resulted in ‘asset redeployment’ rather than in ‘asset stripping’. 
At least, there is no general perception of large-scale plunder (e.g., in contrast to Russia). 
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favourable to the rule of law and to building market institutions, has emerged in Poland as a result 
of the prospective EU accession (Berglof and Bolton 2002). Finally, the fact that the top capital 
incomes holders in Poland are disproportionally foreigners removes a large part of the property 
income from resident income distribution.66 It plays a part in lower top income shares in Poland 
and Central Eastern Europe than in Russia,67 where more considerable foreign ownership has not 
been an option. Overall, a markedly different transition experience in Poland and Russia (see also 
Table 3) suggests that there was no predetermined trajectory of inequalities during the transition. 
It clearly shows that policies and institutions play an important role in shaping inequality. 
Figure 12: Top 1 per cent in Poland, Germany, France and Sweden, 1914-2014 
Source: Poland: authors' computation based on income tax statistics. Distribution of fiscal income among tax units. 
Other countries: WID.world. Note: 1914-1919 for Poland refers to the Prussian Poland. 
66
 A substantially higher foreign ownership in the new EU members in Central Eastern Europe is the consequence of 
the general convergence strategy that has relied on economic integration within the EU. 
67
 For example, Figure A11 shows that from the total distributed capital income in the country, foreigners have re-
ceived almost as large portion as the Polish households. 
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Figure 13: Top 1 per cent in former communist countries, 1890-2015 
Source: Poland: authors' computation based on income tax statistics. Distribution of fiscal income among tax units. 
Other countries: WID.world. 
Figure 14: Bottom 50 per cent in Poland, China, France, and Russia, 1980-2015  
Source for Poland: Authors’ computation (see section 2). Distribution of pre-tax national income (before taxes and 
transfers, except pensions and unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults. Other countries: WID. world. 
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Figure 15: Top 10 per cent in Poland, China, France, and Russia, 1980-2015 
Source for Poland: Authors’ computation (see section 2). Distribution of pre-tax national income (before taxes and 
transfers, except pensions and unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults. Other countries: WID. world. 
Table 3: Income growth and inequality in France 1983-2014 and Russia 1989-2016 
Income group 
(distribution of 
per adult pre-tax 
national in-
come) 
Poland France Russia 
Total cumu-
lated 
real growth 
1989-2015 
Share in total 
macro growth 
1989-2015 
Total cumu-
lated 
real growth 
1983-2014 
Share in total 
macro growth 
1983-2014 
Total cumu-
lated 
real growth 
1989-2016 
Share in total 
macro growth 
1989-2016 
Full Population 73% 100% 35% 100% 41% 100% 
Bottom 50% 31% 13% 31% 21% -20% -15% 
Middle 40% 47% 30% 27% 37% 15% 16% 
Top 10% 190% 57% 49% 42% 171% 99% 
Top 1% 458% 24% 33% 21% 429% 56% 
Top 0.1% 1019% 9% 98% 21% 1054% 34% 
Top 0.01% 2273% 3% 133% 8% 2134% 17% 
Top 0.001% 5066% 1% 144% 3% 4122% 8% 
Source: Poland: Authors’ computation (see section 2). Distribution of pre-tax national income (before taxes and 
transfers, except pensions and unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults. France: see Garbinti et al. (2017) 
(Table 2b). Russia: see Novokmet et al. (2018a) (Table 2).  
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6. Conclusion
This paper has combined tax, survey and national accounts data to provide first consistent series 
on the long-term income distribution in Poland. We draw a U-shaped evolution of income 
inequality in Poland throughout the 20th century. Inequality was high in the first half of the 20th 
century due to high concentration of capital income at the top of the distribution. As documented 
now in many countries, the downward trend was induced by the fall in capital income 
concentration. The introduction of communism signified comparatively greater shock to capital 
incomes relative to other countries. The communist system eliminated private capital income and 
in addition compressed earnings. During the four decades of the communist rule, inequality 
displayed notable stability at the lower levels. 
After the fall of communism, the Polish income inequality experienced a substantial and steady 
rise and today is at the level of more unequal European countries. We show that official survey-
based measures substantially underestimate the rise of inequality since the end of communism, 
primarily by underestimating the top of the income distribution. We correct household surveys 
with the administrative data on high-income taxpayers and document that top 10% has captured 
almost two-thirds of the post-communist economic growth. While the initial growth during the 
transition in the 1990s was induced both by the rise of top labour and capital incomes, the strong 
rise of top income shares in 2000s was driven solely by the increase in top capital incomes. We 
relate the rise in top capital incomes to current globalization forces, which have rebalanced the 
division of national income in favour of capital. 
This study shows that the evolution of inequality is critically shaped by the inextricable workings 
of economic, social and political forces. The Polish inequality history clearly suggests that that the 
secular fall in inequality in the first half of the 20th century was not a necessary (or natural) feature 
of the development process, but equally that the rise of inequality is not inevitable (Kuznets 1955; 
Piketty 2001, 2014). Dramatic changes in top income shares during the rise and fall of communism 
in Eastern Europe speak about the central role of institutions and policies in shaping long-term 
inequality patterns. A claim evidenced by the markedly different distributional outcome of the 
transition in Russia, on the one hand, and Poland and other former post-communist countries in 
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CE Europe, on the other. Therefore, to understand the future inequality dynamics in Poland we 
should turn our attention to factors shaping institutions and policy choices, including the 
ideological debate centered on the growth-equity tradeoff. Communism was the radical solution 
in part to address high inequalities, and its failure has played a role in accepting higher inequality 
in post-communist Poland. 
Rising income inequality in Poland has important political and social implications. It shows that 
the official numbers on the average GDP growth might have little in common with the actual lived 
experience of the most people. By looking at the evolution of income inequality we can understand 
often quite divergent experience of the strong Polish growth among the population (Grosfeld and 
Senik 2010). Those “left behind” are often missing from the public discourse, which further fuels 
the illusion of inclusive growth and limits the demand for social policies. The victory of anti-
globalisation Law and Justice party in the 2015 parliamentary elections and the strong support for 
its flagship redistributive social programs might be a reflection of the Polish post-transition devel-
opment model. As a result, inequality stands today at the heart of the democratic debate in Poland 
and worldwide. There is a room for the more inclusive growth to be strived both on the domestic 
and the EU front, such as education and innovation strategy, the optimal structure of the tax system 
(Diamond and Saez 2011, Kopczuk 2012), rebalancing bargaining power between capital and la-
bour (Bell et al. 2018; Rodrik 1997), or even the bias of the technological change (Atkinson 2015). 
Finally, this paper shows promising avenues for future research. Most importantly, our work pre-
sents the central building block for constructing comprehensive Distributional National Accounts 
for Poland (Bukowski et al. 2019). We emphasize several extensions directly building on our work. 
First, it is important to produce both the pre-tax and post-tax income distribution, to assess the 
redistributive role of the government. Next, the new distributional statistics should also provide 
insights into the distribution of different socio-economic dimensions such as gender, age, region, 
etc. As pointed out in the paper, it would be especially useful to provide the breakdown by labour 
and capital income for the whole income distribution. This could shed light on the role of different 
economic mechanisms in the inequality dynamics, such as international trade or automation. 
Lastly, the high concentration of business income in Poland calls for further research on the rela-
tive importance of human vs. non-human capital at the top of the income distribution, as well as 
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its future implications for growth and inequality (Piketty 2014, Smith et al. 2019). Relatedly, there 
is a need to look together at income and wealth distribution (Piketty et al. 2018, Fisher et al. 2018, 
Kuhn et al. 2018). 
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Appendix A.1: Top Income Shares, 1892-2015: Methodology and 
Data Sources
A.1.1. The Prussian Partition 1890-1918 
Data. Prussia assumes a special place in the analysis of historical distributional patterns, primarily due to 
the early introduction of the comprehensive income tax in the nineteenth century, which was accompanied 
by regular annual publications of the detailed statistics. Most importantly, this coincided with the 
industrialization and the structural transformation of the country’s economy, the emergence of the modern 
economic growth and the eventual rise of Germany to the global economic pre-eminence.68 For the same 
reason, the Prussian income tax data offer invaluable research opportunities to study the long- term 
evolution of inequality in Poland. 
Data for Prussian Poland come from the annual Statistics of income tax assessment (Statistik der 
preußischen Einkommensteuer-Veranlagung). We use available tabulations for provinces (Provinzen) and 
districts (Regierungbezirke) to construct top income shares for Prussian provinces with predominantly (or 
significant) Polish population, which formed after WWI the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939). Top 
income shares are constructed for provinces of Posen, West Prussia and Silesia. The latter should be, 
however, distinguished from the first two provinces, as Germans accounted there for the predominant part 
of the population in the pre-WW1 period, and only the district Oppeln (Opole) joined the interwar Poland 
(as Upper Silesia). The region itself did not form a part of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (moreover, it 
became a part of Prussia only after Frederick the Great had taken it from Habsburgs during the so-called 
Silesian Wars) and it was included in Poland after the Second World War. We generally focus our attention 
on the district Oppeln. Parts of Prussian provinces of Pomerania and East Prussia are today within the Polish 
borders (the other parts of the former Prussia are in Germany, Russia and Lithuania), but we do not 
investigate them separately as these were not generally identified as ‘historic Polish lands’,69 and use them 
in analysis for comparative purposes.  
Published tabulations are ranged according to brackets of gross income, giving for each bracket the number 
of taxpayers and the corresponding tax obligation. Statistics at the level of districts provide almost seventy 
brackets, which can aggregated to the provincial level. In addition, there are separate reports for the number 
of taxpayers in towns and in the countryside at the provincial and the district level (these were ranged by 
six brackets). However, the sources of income are not available at the bracket level, but only in total for all 
taxpayers.  
Population Control. The tax unit in Prussia was household, defined as the married couple with dependants. 
The total number of households in provinces is estimated from the Population Census (Die Volkszählung 
68
 The use of the Prussian data has been used for coining path breaking theories in the development economics concerned with the 
interaction of inequality and economic growth, or the often-termed literature in the Kuznetsian tradition. One should be thus re-
minded that the Prussian income data actually served as the basis for the Kuznets’ inverse-U evolution of inequality during the 
economic development. They present an unambiguous evidence of the rising inequality during the industrialization phase of the 
country in the second half of the nineteenth century until the First World War, as well as the ensuing fall afterwards (Prokopovitch 
1926; Kuznets 1955; Müller and Geisenberger 1972; Keaelble 1986; Dumke 1991).
69
 For example, Prussians never included them in widely used term of ‘our Polish provinces’ (Davies 2005). 
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im deutschen Reich) and the Statistical Yearbook (Statistisches Handbuch für den Preussischen Staat; 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich) 
Income Control. The income control totals for provinces in Prussian Poland have been obtained by 
estimating the income of those exempt from the income tax (‘non-filers’) (e.g. Prokopovitch 1926). The 
statistics provide both the total number of taxpayers (filers) and non-filers for each province and district. 
With the reported total income of taxpayers, it remains to estimate the total income of non-filers. We assume 
that non-filers in each province had the same average income as in Prussia on the whole. The figures for 
Prussia are obtained from Hoffman and Müller (1959, Tab. 35), who estimated them based on Statistische 
Reichsamt (1932). The latter also provides the income of tax exempt at the provincial level for 1900, 1907 
and 1913. The available estimates for these years are very close to those obtained by the above method. 
Hoffman and Müller (1959) do not cover the 1914-1918 period, so we take the average income of non-
filers in Prussia from Dell (2008), who followed the methodology of the former authors. 
A.1.2. The Austrian Partition 1890-1914 
Data. Top income shares in Galicia are constructed from income tax statistics for Imperial Austria - Sta-
tistical Yearbooks of Imperial Austria (Österreichisches Statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrathe ver-
tretenen Königreiche und Lände) as well from Annual Report of Ministry of Finance (Mitteilungen des K. 
K. Finanzministeriums). After the income tax was introduced in 1898, the fiscal administration was pub-
lishing tabulations of income taxpayers in each province of Cisleithania. Income definition was quite broad 
allowing very few exemptions. It defined income from following sources: land, buildings, business and 
self-employment, capital and other sources. Capital gains were not taxed. Tax unit was a family with the 
total income of family members ascribed to the head of a family.  
Population Control. The tax unit in Imperial Austria was household, defined as the married couple with 
children. The total number of households in Galicia is estimated as the number of adults (above 18 years of 
age) minus the number of married female. The data come from the Austro-Hungarian censuses of 1890, 
1900 and 1910 (Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung in den im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreichen und 
Ländern) 
Income Control. The control total for income for Galicia during the Habsburg era is derived as follows. 
We take as our starting point Schulze’s (2007) estimates of regional GDP in Austria-Hungary. Schulze 
provides estimates for 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910, expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis international 
dollars. In order to convert estimates for Galicia into current Austro-Hungarian crowns, we take the 
following steps. First, we convert these estimates to 1913 crowns by applying the exchange rate used by 
Schulze (namely 3.36 GK dollars per crown; see Schulze 1997, p. 14). To obtain GDP for the years between 
1890, 1900 and 1910, we apply real growth rates of GDP for Galicia taken from Ciccareli and Missiaia 
(2014). Next, nominal values were obtained by using regional living cost indices in Austria-Hungary 
estimated by Cvrcek (2013). Finally, we take 60 per cent of nominal GDP as our total control income. 
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A.1.3. Interwar Poland 1918-1939 
Data. The tax data come from the official publications of interwar Ministry of Finance, the Central 
Statistical Office of Poland, as well as Ministry’s archives in Archiwum Akt Nowych in Warsaw. For more 
details see the table below. 
Table: Data sources for the period 1918-1939 
Source Name: Years available: Publisher and Comments 
Rocznik Ministerstwa Skarbu 1928 (Yearbook of the 
Ministry of Finance 1928)  1924, 1925, 1926 The Ministry of Treasure / The Ministry 
of Finance 
Rocznik Ministerstwa Skarbu 1927-1930 (Yearbook of the 
Ministry of Finance 1927-1930) 1925,1926,1927,1928 
The Ministry of Treasure / The Ministry 
of Finance 
Statystyka Podatków Bezpośrednich, Opłat Stemplowych i 
Danin Pośrednich 1931 1925,1926,1927,1928 The Ministry of Treasure / The Ministry 
of Finance 
Statystyka Wymiaru Państwowego Podatku Dochodowego 
za Rok Podatkowy 1927 1927 The Central Statistical Office of Poland 
Witold Berhnard, “Obciążenie Państwowemi Podatkami 
Bezpośredniemi”, Kwartalnik Statystyczny VIII (4) 1931, 
p.901-919 
1929 The Central Statistical Office of Poland 
Statystyka Skarbowa 1933 1929, 1930 
The Central Statistical Office of Poland; 
the data do not separate legal and 
psychical persons 
Statystyka Wymiaru Państwowego Podatku Dochodowego 
za Rok Podatkowy 1936 
1936 The Central Statistical Office of Poland 
Ministry’s archives in Archiwum Akt Nowych in Warsaw 1929, 1936, 1938 Incomplete, only earnings. 
The tax code defined two types of income: unearned (fundowany) and earned (niefundowany). The unearned 
category included income earned by either legal or psychical person, whose economic activity is independ-
ent, for instance, capitalists, entrepreneurs, self-employed, artisans, farmers or petty bourgeoisie. A broad 
range of activities was taxed this way, including agriculture, forestry, land and real estate rents, business 
activities, capital income (e.g. interests, dividends), royalties. Non-monetary income, such as natural con-
sumption or imputed rents of owner-occupiers, was not subject to taxation. Earned income was attributed 
to employees or retired physical persons. Importantly, state workers and state pensioners do not appear in 
the tax statistics, even though they were liable to PIT. 
For psychical persons only annual income above 1500zł for unearned income and 2500zł for earned income 
had to be reported. These two types of incomes were subject to different tax scheme, and the tax statistics 
provide separate tabulations for each type. However, this implies that psychical persons who earned both 
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unearned and earned incomes were reported twice. Similarly, a person was reported multiple times if her 
earned income came from more than one employer in different tax catchment areas. To our best knowledge, 
it is impossible to separate these individuals. Therefore, we assume ‘Ricardian’ system of distinct classes, 
that is, that of zero overlap between unearned and earned taxpayers at the top and we ignore the multiple 
employer problem. 
The tax code used two definitions of tax unit, household and individual. An individual reported income 
from self-employment, wages or pensions. All other types of income were reported at the household level. 
This rises a problem with a clear definition of tax unit for unearned income, since it could be either house-
hold or individual. In the case of earned income, it was always individual.70  
PIT covered a very broad range of economic activities, except incomes coming from inheritance, property 
selling, income of non-profit oriented entities, lotteries and other minor sources. From the total income, a 
taxpayer could deduct paid interests on loans, rents and permanent financial obligations originating from 
the legal requirements, social security (up to 300zł), insurance benefits (up to 300zł per individual or 600zł 
per household) and other taxes. In the case of unearned income, the actual income was reported by those 
taxpayers who had accounting books. For others, the administrations imputed income based on a set of 
payer’s characteristics.  
Tabulations are ranged according to income before taxation and deductions, for each income bracket there 
is information on the number of taxpayers and the total tax paid. All income within bracket paid a fixed 
amount of tax. We estimate the total income in each bracket by assuming Pareto distribution (see below), 
but since brackets’ range is quite narrow our estimates do not depend on particular distributional assump-
tion. A potential problem is that the tabulations contain only taxpayers that paid personal income tax. Even 
if an individual’s income was above the minimum filing threshold, after deductions her income could fall 
below the threshold and did not appear in the statistics. However, since we look at fractiles whose thresholds 
are much higher than the minimum filing threshold, this does not lead to underestimation of top income 
shares. 
For the years 1925 and 1926, it is impossible to separate physical and legal persons reporting unearned 
income. We estimate the number of physical persons in each bracket of unearned tax schedule in 1925 and 
1926 by taking the proportion of physical persons in all ‘unearned taxpayers’ observed in 1927 (note that 
bracket ranges were unchanged throughout the years). In general, the proportion of legal persons in total 
unearned taxpayers is very small, corresponding to less than 1% of all unearned taxpayers (0.8% in 1927, 
0.7% in 1928 and 1929), but these are dominantly concentrated at the very top of the income distribution. 
However, the proportion of legal persons is quite stable throughout the years. For example, when the pro-
portion of physical persons in the total taxpayers in 1926 is taken to correspond that observed in 1927, the 
top 1 per cent (the top 0.1 per cent) share is 11.68% (3.56%). When the proportion from 1928 is taken 
instead, the top share is 11.78% (3.65%). Even when we apply the proportion documented a decade later, 
70
 Wiśniewski (1934) unfortunately does not discuss this issue in detail. Using the census data, for unearned income he estimated 
the control population assuming that the tax unit are: agriculture holdings, for-profit entrepreneurs, self-employed, petty bourgeoi-
sie. For earned income he distinguished between agricultural workers and other workers. 
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in 1936, our estimates are not significantly affected (11.57% (3.49%)). These margins of error seem rea-
sonable enough to use our estimates for 1925 and 1926 without raising too much unease. 
The same approach is taken for 1930 and 1935 - for which equally the statistics on unearned income does 
not distinguish between personal and legal persons - by taking the proportions of physical persons in all 
unearned taxpayers documented in 1929 and 1936, respectively. Unfortunately for these years, the statistics 
on earned income is also lacking. However, as unearned income accounts for the predominant part of in-
come at the very top (for example, it made almost 90 per cent of income for the top 0.1 per cent and above) 
and rises with income rank, we provide estimates for the top 0.1 per cent and the groups above by simply 
taking the number of taxpayers reporting earned income in 1929 and 1936 in the corresponding top brackets. 
In addition, as top earnings exhibited certain rigidity during the depression, it is probable that the ‘crisis 
years’ of 1930 and 1935 saw similar earnings distribution at the very top as in the immediate neighbouring 
years for which the statistics are available. 
Population Control. As mentioned above, the tax unit in interwar Poland was both household and 
individual depending on the income source obtained. Namely, someone obtaining employment income was 
individually taxed, while for other sources incomes of all family members were combined and attributed to 
the ‘head of family’. We take as our population control a hybrid construct defined as the total number of 
adults minus the number of married women not employed or self-employed. Our definition thus treats 
working females as separate tax units, but note that most of them were actually not married (according to 
1931 census, less than 15 per cent of employed females outside agriculture were married (Maly Rocznik 
1939, p. 260, Tab. 5)), and therefore the total reference roughly corresponds to the total number of married 
couples plus singles. 
The number of adults is taken from population censuses (and annual figures from the statistics on the 
Movement of the Population), while the number of non-working females is equally found in censuses and 
linearly interpolated for in-between years.  
Income Control. To arrive at the total control for income, we take the estimate of Kalecki and Landau 
(1934) for 1929 as our starting point. This estimate has remained the main reference point for all subsequent 
estimation of national income in interwar Poland up to present day. Kalecki and Landau’s (K&L) estimate 
is gross of depreciation, roughly corresponding to GDP and based onthe expenditure approach. K&L 
extended their calculations only for 1933 (Kalecki and Landau 1935), so we have relied on studies of 
Klarner (1937) and Petyniak-Sanecki (1939) for other years in the 1929-1936 period for which the tax data 
is available. The latter authors followed closely the methodological approach used by K&L (Landau 1976, 
pp. 110-1).  
However, no subsequent study focused on the years before 1929. We adopted the following approach to 
estimate total income in 1927 and 1928. K&L provide indices of the real development of the national in-
come for the period 1927-1934 (1935, Tab. 116).71 We take K&L’s GDP for 1929 and apply the corre-
sponding growth rates to obtain real GDP figures in 1927 and 1928. We checked the K&L indices by 
71
 The methodology was developed within the Institute for the Study of Business Cycles and Price. These series are not based on 
comprehensive estimates of consumption and investment as for the 1929 and 1933 (see Kalecki and Landau 1935). 
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comparing them with the real GDP growth rates in Maddison (2001) (available for 1929 to 1938; from 
Laski (1956)), and find quite close development. This should come as no surprise since Maddison takes the 
estimates of the Institute of Economic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, which are based on the 
work of K&L. Finally, to obtain the nominal level, we use the average of the wholesale price index and the 
retail price index (Maly Rocznik Statystyczny for 1933, Tab. 1, p. 93). 
The next step in using the ‘top-bottom’ approach for the total income control consists in subtracting from 
GDP items not included in personal income such as the consumption of fixed capital, public sector income, 
retained earnings of corporate sector, or non-taxable personal income. Due to the general lack of detailed 
historical national accounts, especially with respect to the income method, the usual practice for estimating 
personal income has been to assume some fixed fraction of GDP (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010). 
Wisniewski (1934) in the study on income distribution in Poland in 1929 estimated the total taxable income 
as equalling 82 per cent of the K&L national aggregate. However, Wisniewski’s total income does not only 
add the income below the minimum exemption level (that is, the income of non-filers) to the total reported 
income of filers, but he ‘corrects’ the tax data through the whole distribution by using alternative sources 
(such as the distribution of agricultural holdings from the land tax in order to account for the assumed 
misreporting of income derived from the land). Consequently, we take a smaller proportion of GDP than 
Wisniewski did, namely 75 per cent of GDP.  
For 1925 and 1926 we exploit the available estimates of national income. These are net of depreciation, so 
we assumed that the total control for income equals 80 per cent of national income. Following Kazimerz 
Secomski, consumption of fixed capital is taken as 5 per cent of GDP (Landau 1976, p. 110).  Landau 
(1976) reports dozens of national income estimates of various authors for the 1923-5 period. The range of 
estimates is quite large. Those that explicitly refer to 192572 are in a range between 15 and 20 million zl (in 
1927 parity), and as a middle ground, we take 17,5 mil zloty as an estimate of national income. The year 
1926 was the last year of post-inflation depression (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985) and we assume no real 
growth between the years. 
One should just note that in 1927 there was a change in parity of zloty to gold franc, with 1 zloty of 1924 
worth 1.72 zloty of 1927. However, the tax statistics for 1924-6 was published from 1927 onwards, and 
taxpayers in the mentioned years are ranged according to the brackets denominated according to the new 
parity. Consequently, when estimating the total control income for 1924-6 one needs to convert available 
estimates of national income from 1924 parity to 1927 parity. 
Estimation of income in tax brackets. For most of the years in the interwar period, only the number of 
taxpayers in specific brackets of gross income is reported without providing their corresponding income. 
We estimate income in each bracket by assuming that top incomes follow Pareto distribution. 
Pareto cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝐹(𝑦𝑦) for income 𝑦𝑦 is: 
1 −  𝐹𝐹(𝑦𝑦)  =  (𝑘𝑘/𝑦𝑦)ᵅ        
72
 As stated by Landau (1976, p. 105): «In many cases, it is also difficult to determine precisely for which year the estimate was 
made. We know that they relate to the years 1923-1925. 
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where 1 −  𝐹𝐹(𝑦𝑦) is the proportion of tax units with income above 𝑦𝑦. Parameters 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑎𝑎 are given; 𝑘𝑘 pre-
sents the minimum income to which the Pareto distribution is applicable (𝑘𝑘 > 0), and 𝑎𝑎 presents the slope 
of distribution (𝑎𝑎 >  1) (Cowell 2011).  
In order to estimate amounts in bracket (𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡), it is assumed that income in each bracket is distributed ac-
cording to Pareto law. Let 𝑝𝑝 present the proportion of tax units above 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑞𝑞 the proportion of tax units 
above 𝑡𝑡, then: 𝑝𝑝 =  (𝑘𝑘/𝑠𝑠)ᵅ 𝑞𝑞 =  (𝑘𝑘/𝑡𝑡)ᵅ 
From these equations, we obtain parameters 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑘𝑘:  𝑎𝑎 =  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 [(𝑝𝑝/𝑞𝑞)]/𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 [𝑡𝑡/𝑠𝑠] 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(1𝑎𝑎)
We estimate 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑘𝑘 for each bracket. Finally, the income in bracket (𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡) is estimated as 
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁 ∫ 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹(𝑦𝑦)𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
where 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of tax units. However, this method cannot be applied to the top bracket. We 
assume that Pareto coefficient in the top bracket to be the same as the bracket immediately below it. 
A.1.4. The county-level inequality in Interwar Poland 
Data. The 1927 Income Tax Statistics published by Ministry of Finance provides the detailed tabulations 
of earned and unearned income for each tax office in Interwar Poland. In rural areas, there was usually one 
office per county, whereas in urban areas there were usually more than one, in which case we aggregate the 
data to the county level. In three cases, Gniezno, Inowroclaw and Lublin, the tax office catchment areas 
were larger than the corresponding county and covered the rural and urban counties. We merge these 
counties to match the tax office.  
Since the data on population and income controls is from the 1931 census, we match the 1927 tax offices 
with the 1931 counties. It was straightforward for the majority of cases, except those counties where borders 
changed or which were liquidated between 1927 and 1931. In these cases, we assign a tax office to a 1931 
county, which received the largest portion of a 1927 county. We drop Konstantynów and Królewska Huta 
counties, as it was impossible to determine a corresponding 1931 county. 
Similarly as in the aggregate tax tables, the highest bracket for unearned income is open. To determine the 
average income of the richest, we apply the Pareto extrapolation to each county separately. Finally, to obtain 
the total amount of income we assume that unearned and earned income taxpayers are different individuals 
and merge their number for each bracket. The thresholds of earned income brackets are usually narrower 
than of unearned income, in which cases we combine the earned brackets to match the unearned ones.  
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Population Control. Similarly as for the country-level analysis, we take as our population control the 
total number of adults minus the number of married women not employed or self-employed. The county-
level data comes from the 1931 census. 
Income Control. We construct control income for each county consistently the reported taxable income 
from the 1927 Income Tax Statistics. We separately estimate the earned income of agriculture and non-
agriculture workers; the exempted unearned income of independent in agriculture and non-agriculture 
activities.  
For earned income of non-agriculture workers, the data on the voivodeship-level total compensation of 
industrial workers in nine industries (mineral, metal, electro technical, chemical, textile, paper, tannery, 
wood and food) come from the 1931 Industry Statistics (Statystyka Przemysłowa 1931). The county-level 
data on the number of workers in fifteen industries and non-manufacturing sectors come from the 1931 
census of population. To obtain the total earned non-agriculture income for each county, we calculate the 
average compensation for each voivodship-industry cell and multiply it by the county-level number of 
workers in the corresponding industry (Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludności z Dn. 9.XII 1931 r.). For the 
industries not covered by the 1931 Industry Statistics we use the average voivodeship-level compensation; 
for domestic servants, we use one-third of the average; for public administration workers we use 2/3 of the 
average, and for the remaining workers we assume ½ of the average. In other words, we assume that all 
workers in voivodeship-industry cells earn the same average compensation. To obtain the total earned non-
agriculture income we add the estimated earned income of industry workers, domestic servants, public 
administration workers and others. In addition, we increase the total amount by 50% to match the country 
total. 
To obtain earned income of agriculture workers, we calculate the average income of agriculture workers 
and the average income of agriculture ‘white collar’ workers (dozorca) for each voivodeship using use the 
data from Gerlicz (1929). As the original data is in the quintals of rye, we use The Statistics of Prices 1929 
(Statystyka Cen, 1927-37) to translate the numbers into the Polish Zloty. Next, for each county, we multiply 
the number of agriculture ‘blue collar’ workers by the voivodeship average and the number of agriculture 
‘white collar’ workers by the voivodeship average for ‘white collar’ occupations. To obtain the total earned 
income of agriculture workers we sum up the total income of ordinary and ‘white collar’ workers. 
Next we estimate exempted unearned non-agriculture income. The 1931 census provides the county-level 
number of non-agriculture independents, which we multiply by one-third of the average unearned taxed 
income. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there is no available separate data on the income of 
independents in non-agricultural sectors.  
Finally, we calculate exempted unearned agriculture income. First, based on the estimates from the Puławy 
Institute and Wisniewski (1934) we assume that all landholdings smaller than 5ha did not pay the income 
tax. The total number of these landholdings is taken from the 1927 land tax. Second, we assume that only 
in certain counties landholdings between 5-10ha paid the income tax. In particular, we take the number of 
landholdings from the 5-10ha band in the 1927 land tax, if it is smaller than the difference between the 
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hypothetical number of exempted agriculture independent73 and the number of landholdings smaller than 
5ha. Otherwise, we use the difference. Finally, we multiply the number of landholdings in each band by 2/3 
of the average voivodeship-level agriculture income reported by the Puławy Institute. We take the fraction 
of the income because the estimates are believed to be upward biased (Wisniewski 1934)  
To obtain the total county-level control income, we sum up the earned agriculture income, the earned non-
agriculture income, the exempted unearned agriculture income, the exempted unearned non-agriculture 
income and the unearned taxed income.  
A.1.5. Communist Poland 1945-1989 
Data. The design of income tax during the first years after the end of WW2 kept broad contours of the 
interwar legislation. The major change, however, was to exempt earned and agriculture incomes, and tax 
only non-agriculture unearned income. In addition, the socialised sector was not a subject of taxation, and 
the law set a relatively high-income threshold. Consequently, with continuous government’s attempts to 
limit private entrepreneurship, the income tax de facto lost its economic importance. 
Tabulations of taxpayers obtaining unearned income are available for three years in the late 1940s: for 1945, 
1946 and 1947. Unfortunately, there are no corresponding tabulations for earnings. But in order to provide 
an indication of the post-war development of top income shares, we combine the income tax statistics on 
unearned income for 1947 with the earnings data from employer survey in 1949. Obviously, the critical 
assumption has been that earnings distribution remained stable between 1947 and 1949.  
Earnings survey provides tabulations of employees in industry and construction, respectively, ranged 
according to monthly earnings. Separate reports are given for manual and white-collar workers, ranged 
separately for technicians and office workers. We merge respective tabulations according to worker’s 
qualification, and then of all workers in industry and construction. The resulting joint distribution accounts 
for roughly 70 per cent of employees covered by social insurance in firms with more than 5 employees 
(exclusive of agriculture). We assume that the remaining 30 per cent of employees (e.g. in 
telecommunication, wholesale or retail trade, accommodation) is distributed in the same manner as those 
in (combined) industry and construction. On the other hand, it is assumed that employees in firms with less 
than 5 employees, or employees in agriculture as well as in those not covered by social insurance, do not 
end up in higher earnings brackets, and thus do not make up top income groups. We adjust earnings bands 
in 1949 to the price level of 1947 by using the available retail price index.74 Annual earnings were obtained 
by multiplying bracket middle point by twelve. For the earnings in the open top bracket, we assumed that 
two top brackets follow Pareto distribution. Finally, as in the interwar period, we assumed no overlap 
between individuals obtaining unearned income and earnings.  
73
  The number of hypothetical exempted agriculture independents is calculated using the 1937 tax data, which reported the number 
of taxpayers and income for the total unearned sector and for unearned agriculture. We relate two ratios, the agriculture taxpay-
ers/agriculture income and total taxpayers/total income. Next we apply this relationship to the 1927 tax data to obtain the number 
of agriculture taxpayers (which is not reported). Finally, we subtract this value from the total number of smallholdings from the 
1927 land tax. 
74
 However, as we are aware, this is available only for Warsaw. 
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In order to construct top income estimates for the 1956-1990 period (Figure 2) we have used enterprise 
wage surveys, covering employees in the socialized sector (for sources and details see Appendix A.4). 
Namely, it has been assumed that only wage earners constituted top income groups in this period since 
unearned income was to the greatest extent expropriated by the state after a thorough nationalisation wave 
and the land reform in the late 1940s, coupled with the currency reform in 1950. The remaining non-wage 
private income was largely concentrated in the small-scale agriculture, characterised by the low 
productivity and the small earning potential, and thus plausibly did not contribute to top incomes.  
Population Control. For the population control in 1947, we used the same definition as for the interwar 
period. The population unit in the 1956-1990 period is individual. The data is taken from the population 
censuses and the Demographic Yearbook of Poland (Rocznik Demograficzny)  
Income Control. To arrive at the total income for 1947, we use the official estimate for the national 
income (Rocznik Statystyczny 1949, p. 27, Tab. 1). This figure, however, refers to the Marxist concept of 
national income, 75  corresponding to the net material product (thus exclusive of services, or ‘non-
productive’ activities such as housing, education, administration, etc.). We increase this figure by 15 percent 
to obtain the estimate of national income according to SNA, as this proportion has been often found to 
account for services (according to GUS 1949), services in the interwar period accounted for 17 percent of 
national income). 
We take 65 per cent of this adjusted figure to correspond to the total income control. This is somewhat 
lower proportion than used in the interwar period, because the communist accession to power resulted in 
the increase of the so-called ‘social income’ (and thus a fall in personal income) in national income, 
especially through a rise in retained profits of nationalised enterprises (a fall in the wage fund) needed for 
investment.  
A.1.6. Poland 1992-2015 
Data. The table below reports used tax publications for the period 1992-2015. It should be noted that 
tabulations are presented by ranges of taxable income (thus, after deductions) rather than gross income. But 
the total income is provided for each interval, both for income before and after employee social security 
contributions. We apply our preferred income concept and adjust interval thresholds by multiplicative 
factors. The amount of deductions is negligible and should not affect our estimates in any significant way.  
The tax law has been reformed several times since 1992. Because each such event changes the definition 
of reported income, all modifications have to be taken into consideration when analysing the tax statistics. 
There were two major reforms, in 2001 and 2004. In 2001, taxation of capital revenue (interest and 
dividends) and capital gains (i.e. from selling company's shares, stocks, derivatives) has been introduced. 
While the former needs to be taxed using the presumptive tax and is not reported in the statistics, the latter 
is taxed using the progressive scale and thus will appear in the published statistics. Note that both were 
absent from the reports before 2001. The details of the capital income taxation are outlined in below. The 
reform of 2004 introduced an option for business income from non-agricultural business activity (further 
referred as business income) to be taxed separately at the flat rate. We deal with the assumptions concerning 
75
 Accounting system in communist countries was the Material Product System (MPS).
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the imputation of the business income taxed at the flat rate to the top income shares in the next section. 
Similarly, capital gains can also be taxed at the linear rate. 
Table: Data sources for the period 1992-2015 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1992 rok  p. 2 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1993 rok  p. 4 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1994 rok  Biuletyn Skarbowy 3/1995: p. 6 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1995 rok  p. 2; Tab. 1.1 (p. 6) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1996 rok  Biuletyn Skarbowy 6/1997: p. 3; Tab. 1.1 (p. 5) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1997 rok  Biuletyn Skarbowy 6/1998: p. 7; Tab. 1.1 (p. 9) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1998 rok  Biuletyn Skarbowy 5/1999: p. 5; Tab. 1.1 (p. 7) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 1999 rok  Biuletyn Skarbowy 5/2000: p. 9; Tab. 1.3 (p. 11) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2000 rok  p. 4; Tab. 1.3 (p. 6) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2001 rok  p. 5; Tab. 1.3, (p. 8) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2002 rok  p. 5; Tab. 1.3 (p. 8) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2003 rok  p. 5; Tab. 1.3 (p. 8) 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2004 rok  p. 5; Tab. 4.4 (p. 10); p. 23 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2005 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 10); p. 39 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2006 rok  p.5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 11); p. 40 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2007 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 11); p. 40 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2008 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 11); p. 36 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2009 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 11); p. 36 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2010 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 12); p. 46 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2011 rok  p. 5 ;  Tab. 4.4 (p. 11); p. 38 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2012 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 11); p. 34 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2013 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 11); p. 33 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2014 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 10); p. 30 
Informacja dotycząca rozliczenia... od osób fizycznych za 2015 rok  p. 5 ; Tab. 4.4 (p. 10); p. 30 
In our estimations of the top income shares, we exclude capital gains and income from real estate. The 
reasons are twofold. Firstly, these sources of income are negligible. The tax statistics show that, for instance, 
between 2004 and 2013 the average income from capital gains was less than 1% (min 0.5%, max 2%) of 
the total income. At the same time, merging these sources of income with the progressive schedule would 
involve a lot of ad hoc assumptions. Secondly, we want to make our estimates consistent across years as 
much as possible. Since capital gains were not taxed before 2001, and the real estate income before 2009, 
their inclusion would distort comparison of the top income shares across the period of interest. In the on-
going project (Bukowski et al. 2019) we use the universe of individual tax returns to estimate the 
distribution for the definition of income including capital gains and real estate income. 
Merging income across tax regimes after 2004. Poland engaged in the flat tax reform in 2004. In 
comparison to some other countries in Central and Eastern Europe that introduced a flat income tax, the 
extent of the reform in Poland was less comprehensive and consisted ‘only’ in the introduction of the flat 
rate option for certain categories of personal income. Most importantly, individuals obtaining business 
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income could after that choose between taxation of this income separately at the flat rate or at the 
progressive scale with the rest of their income as before.76 
Until 2009 there were three brackets in the progressive schedule with the respective marginal rates of 19, 
30 and 40 percent, and afterwards, they were reduced to two with the respective marginal rates of 18 and 
32 percent. 
All taxable income, even below the tax exemption threshold, should be reported. Taxpayers using only the 
progressive scale submit only one tax form (PIT 36 or PIT 37, depending on the source of income). In order 
to use the flat tax for business, an additional form (PIT 36L) must be submitted. Similarly for either capital 
gains or real estate sales income (PIT 38 and PIT 39 respectively). Therefore, one individual might appear 
several times in the tax reports, but will only appear once in the progressive tax part. 
As a result, the personal income tax statistics has provided distinct reports for the tax returns submitted 
under the respective tax schedules from 2004 onwards. This has raised a number of methodological chal-
lenges when merging the data from the two reports. As the first step in the merging procedure, it should be 
acknowledged that choosing a flat rate option entails a trade-off (Kopczuk 2012), because on the one hand, 
the high-income individuals could benefit from lower marginal tax rate, but on the other, it would imply a 
broader tax base since they would thus give up the right to tax allowances and tax credits as well as the 
option of joint filling for spouses. This trade-off is presented in the figures below. It is a replication from 
Kopczuk (2012, Fig. 0) who explains in detail the incentives behind opting for flat tax rate regime, and the 
following discussion is closely based on his exposition. 
Figures: Tax obligations in the progressive and flat tax regimes 
The dashed vertical lines indicate the tax-free threshold and the bracket thresholds of the progressive sched-
ule. Black lines indicate the tax liability under the progressive tax rule when using the tax credit only (the 
solid line), the tax credit and taxable income deductions (the dash-doted line), and previous plus the benefits 
of filling jointly with no income spouse (the dashed line). The red line indicates tax liability under the flat 
76
 This option has been allowed additionally for rental income. 
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rate schedule. The tax optimizing behaviour suggests that taxpayers would choose the flat rate option only 
if their business income exceeds a certain breakeven point (black points) where the benefits of the lower 
marginal tax rate outweigh the associated costs of losing tax preferences, and the overall tax liability is 
consequently reduced. Most importantly, the figues shows that the flat rate benefits become dominant only 
at the income levels above the middle bracket threshold and rise depending on the use of available tax 
preferences. After the reform of 2009 there are only two income brackets (indicated by the vertical dashed 
lines). In all the income scenarios outlined above, the breakeven points lie above the top income thresholds. 
In other words, it is profitable to switch to the flat regime only if the business income exceeds the top 
bracket threshold.  
Merging income across the tax regimes is straightforward after 2009, as we simply join the income taxed 
using the flat tax to the income from the progressive top bracket. The situation is more complicated before 
2009 when the break-even point of switching to the flat tax regime might be located within the middle 
bracket. Fortunately, we can support some important assumptions by the insight into the descriptive 
statistics of the income tax microdata. These are provided by Kopczuk (2012) and Bukowski et al. (2019), 
who used the individual-level personal income tax returns covering the 2002-2015 period. 
First, using descriptive statistics from Kopczuk (2012, Table 1), we estimate that 40% of flat tax fillers have 
their income within the range of the middle bracket of the progressive schedule. Then, by assuming that 
these individuals earn middle bracket’s average income (which is likely to be under-estimation), this results 
that business income of these flat tax fillers accounts for 15% of the total business income taxed at the flat 
rate (a proportion that is remarkably constant throughout the years). The remaining 60% of flat tax fillers 
are placed in the top bracket of the progressive schedule with the remaining 85% of total business income 
taxed at the flat rate. 
This number is also supported once we look at changes in the reported flat tax income just before and after 
the reform of 2009. The rationale is that the reform motivated people with the business income within the 
range of the previous middle bracket, to switch from the flat to the progressive regime. Assuming a 
counterfactual increase of business income by 6%, the comparison reveals a drop in the flat tax income of 
around 15%.  
Second, the reports of Ministry of Finance in 2017 estimate that around 65% of the individuals reporting 
their income in the flat regime report also income in the progressive schedule. Before 2009, we assume that 
60% of these individuals are reported in the bottom bracket of the progressive schedule, and 40% in the 
middle bracket. Based on numbers from Kopczuk (2012, Table 1 and Table 2), we move 60% of individuals 
from the bottom bracket to the top bracket and the remaining 40% to the medium bracket. Similarly, we 
move 60% of individuals from the middle bracket to the top bracket, and leave remaining in the middle 
bracket. After 2009, we move 80% to the top bracket (with 20% of the bottom bracket’s average income) 
and keep 20% in the bottom. In all cases, we assume that the progressively-taxed income of overlapping 
individuals is 60% of the bracket’s average income 
Joint taxation. Married couples and single parents have a right to submit a joint tax form. An important 
condition is that neither of spouses (or a single parent) taxes his/her income using the flat rate or the 
presumptive tax. Since the joint report yields tax benefits, married individuals (and single parents) might 
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be thus more reluctant to use the flat regime or the presumptive tax, than unmarried people (without kids). 
In the case of married couples, the reported joint taxable income is a sum of each spouse’s income divided 
by two. A similar construction is used for the single parents, with an exception that the sum consists of 
parent’s and child’s income (if any). The tax publications report the number of taxpayers in each bracket 
after the couple split.  
Population and Income Control. See Appendix 2. 
In our benchmark series, total income is estimated directly by combining survey and tax data. However, as 
a robustness check, we estimate top income shares for the 1992-2015 period using personal income tax 
tabulations and independently estimated total income denominator. We add the following items to approach 
the aggregate that corresponds as closely to the concept of income reported in the tax statistics:  
(i) wages and salaries received by households, net of employers’ social security contributions, plus (ii) 
social security benefits in cash, plus (iii) 50% of profits of household unincorporated enterprises (taken as 
household operating surplus net of depreciation, net of primary income in agriculture and net of imputed 
rents of owners’ occupiers), plus (iv) withdrawals from income of quasi-corporations received by 
households plus 30% of retained earnings of non-financial corporations. 
Income denominator obtained this way results on average in 80 per cent of households’ primary incomes. 
We take only half of the income of household’s unincorporated enterprises because the Central Statistical 
Office publishes the national accounts figures corrected for the concealed activity, which is in the same 
manner concealed from the tax authorities. Moreover, the scope of the non-observed economy was 
especially worrisome for the transition economies. According to official estimates, concealed activity in 
Poland has been the most prevalent in the household sector, for example accounting for as much as 7 per 
cent of GDP in 1998 (United Nations 2003, p. 188).  
It should be noted that in Polish national accounts enterprises smaller than ten employees are included in 
the household sector, while those with ten and above employees in the non-financial corporate sector. We 
take ‘withdrawals from income of quasi-corporations’ as a measure of distributed income of unincorporated 
enterprises in the corporate sector, as the CSO only estimates ‘withdrawals’ paid by non-financial 
corporations, and add 30 per cent of retained earnings of non-financial corporations (as unincorporated 
firms are as ‘pass-through’ entities taxed with their whole profits under PIT).  
For years 1992-1994 we lack comparable external controls for total income to use the method described 
above. Instead, we use an alternative method to obtain total income control, which starts from the total 
income of taxpayers reported in tax statistics and add to it the total income of ‘non-filers’ (Atkinson 2007). 
Using this approach depends on the proportion of the population that files income tax returns. Today in 
Poland the majority of the population actually files personal income tax (either by themselves or by tax 
remitters such as employers or social insurance institutions), in average 85 per cent of our reference for the 
total population, which makes, in theory, this method a reliable alternative. For years 1992-4 we estimate 
total control for income by assuming that the total reported income of filers makes 85 per cent of the total 
income and consequently the total income of non-filers 15 per cent of the total income. This proportion is 
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chosen based on the proportion of the income of filers in the total income in the late 1990s. The data on 
sectoral national accounts is available from the CSO of Poland and Eurostat.  
Appendix 2:  The Full Distribution of Income, 1983-2015: Methodology and 
Data Sources 
A.2.1. Survey data 
We use the household survey data used for the entire 1983-2015 period. For the 1980s, we use aggregated 
the Polish Household Budget Survey (HBS) (Badanie Budżetów Gospodarstw Domowych) data from 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, Tables PI1 and PI2).  The authors provide tabulations of the individual 
distribution of household income per capita by combining the distribution of income for four types of 
households (worker, mixed, farmer, and pensioner households) from the official HBS reports. The 
tabulations are organized by eight income groups, providing in each the number of individuals and the mean 
income.77 For the 1992-2004 period, we use harmonised HBS microdata from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS). The data are available for 1992, 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2004, (survey years). We impute the 
data for the missing in-between years in two steps. First, we upgrade thresholds and average incomes in 
two adjacent survey years by the ratio of average fiscal income per adult in the survey and the missing year 
(obtained from national accounts). Second, we apply linear interpolation between two upgraded estimates 
to obtain thresholds and average income in missing years. For the period 2005-2015 we use the EU Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) collected by Eurostat. 
The unit of observation is the individual aged 20-year-old or more. Household income in survey is equally 
split between all adults who belong to the same household. However, the tax unit in the tax statistics is 
individual whose income is not necessarily equal to income of other adults belonging to the same household. 
We should bear in mind that when combining survey and tax data we make implicit assumptions that high-
income individuals in tax data are either singles, or that all members of the same household have reported 
equal income. 
The LIS data on household income for Poland is net of labour and pension income tax withheld at source. 
We impute pre-tax labour income by grossing the net income using the official tax rates. Business and 
capital income for, which tax is paid directly by individuals, is recorded as gross. The EU-SILC data is 
reported gross of taxes and social security contributions.  
A.2.2. Definition of income 
When joining the survey and tax data, we produce the distribution of the fiscal income. This is the same 
income concept used to construct top income shares series. Several caveats, however, must be mentioned. 
Firstly, the income reported in the tax data does not cover agricultural activities, therefore we implicitly 
77
 One should also bear in mind the survey is fully representative since 1993. Previously, it omitted police, 
army, and non-agricultural private sector (Milanović 1999, Tab. A1). 
62 
assume that there are no top income taxpayers in the agricultural sector. Secondly, it is worth noting that 
income concept in survey data during the socialist period (1983-1989) is that of post-tax (or disposable) 
income. However, as personal income taxes were negligible during the socialist period and employees did 
not contribute to social security from their gross wage, there is no practical difference which of the two 
concepts is used.78  
Further distinction needs to be made between fiscal and national income (as standardly defined (SNA 2008): 
GDP minus consumption of fixed capital plus net foreign income (SNA 2008)). A major difference is due 
to the fact the national income includes in addition tax-exempt capital income, such as undistributed 
corporate profits or imputed rents. At this stage, we provide only the distribution of fiscal income, but, in 
general, it has been found that the fiscal correction (using income tax data) accounts for the bulk of upward 
correction of raw survey inequality, and further adjustment for the distribution of tax-exempt capital income 
has showed to be of relatively limited impact (see, for example, the above mentioned studies on China and 
Russia). But in order to allow an international comparison, we scale fiscal income distribution to the 
national income totals by proportionally upgrading thresholds and average incomes for each percentile of 
the fiscal income distribution. 
78
 Milanović (1999, pp. 322-3), for example, points out that the difference between pre- and post-tax income 
was less than 1%. 
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Table: Population, Average National Income and Inflation; Poland 1992-2015 
Adults (20+) Total Average Average nat. CPI 
population population (1)/(2) % nat. income income 2010=100 
(in thd.) (in thd.) (PLN)  (2010 PLN) 
1992 25,900 38,203 68% 3,839 21,567 18 
1993 26,073 38,239 68% 5,273 21,611 24 
1994 26,254 38,265 69% 8,000 24,615 33 
1995 26,463 38,284 69% 10,910 26,163 42 
1996 26,695 38,294 70% 13,763 27,581 50 
1997 26,948 38,290 70% 16,627 28,967 57 
1998 27,198 38,277 71% 19,199 29,905 64 
1999 27,463 38,263 72% 21,075 30,632 69 
2000 27,348 38,254 71% 23,448 30,934 76 
2001 27,617 38,242 72% 24,157 30,234 80 
2002 27,886 38,219 73% 24,687 30,328 81 
2003 28,183 38,191 74% 25,067 30,532 82 
2004 28,505 38,174 75% 25,610 30,129 85 
2005 28,816 38,157 76% 27,743 31,962 87 
2006 29,099 38,126 76% 29,437 33,527 88 
2007 29,315 38,116 77% 31,752 35,319 90 
2008 29,506 38,136 77% 35,192 37,518 94 
2009 29,686 38,167 78% 35,962 36,922 97 
2010 29,684 38,530 77% 37,450 37,450 100 
2011 29,847 38,538 77% 40,448 38,780 104 
2012 29,999 38,533 78% 41,734 38,643 108 
2013 30,114 38,496 78% 42,403 38,866 109 
2014 30,189 38,479 78% 43,597 39,924 109 
2015 30,266 38,437 79% 45,177 41,792 108 
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Table: Percentiles and Average National Income; Poland 1983-2015 
Average P50 P90 P99 P90-100 P99-100 
1983 23 21 36 69 50 97 
1984 28 26 44 89 63 132 
1985 34 30 54 104 75 141 
1986 42 38 67 129 94 174 
1987 54 49 85 158 117 232 
1988 95 85 151 268 203 393 
1989 382 340 619 1,183 862 1,682 
1992 3,839 3,141 6,060 13,624 10,154 29,774 
1993 5,273 4,311 8,353 18,405 14,341 44,568 
1994 8,000 6,387 12,551 32,840 23,717 80,195 
1995 10,910 8,517 17,019 54,138 34,958 122,201 
1996 13,763 10,805 22,463 65,986 43,234 127,753 
1997 16,627 13,139 26,707 73,140 51,481 166,322 
1998 19,199 14,940 30,317 92,176 61,313 205,896 
1999 21,075 16,615 33,016 104,300 65,414 212,856 
2000 23,448 18,055 37,750 123,902 76,087 233,221 
2001 24,157 18,667 39,553 110,585 77,655 248,314 
2002 24,687 18,787 40,528 123,623 81,709 260,302 
2003 25,067 18,942 42,202 134,893 83,802 240,909 
2004 25,610 19,203 41,658 129,810 87,167 303,435 
2005 27,743 20,264 47,024 139,639 96,335 338,032 
2006 29,437 21,270 47,907 153,508 104,488 380,540 
2007 31,752 22,891 50,481 166,033 114,147 450,430 
2008 35,192 25,135 56,527 187,752 126,619 482,907 
2009 35,962 26,024 58,636 193,547 125,439 434,418 
2010 37,450 27,502 61,078 203,396 130,074 447,597 
2011 40,448 29,670 65,223 218,643 141,364 490,169 
2012 41,734 30,628 67,303 224,714 145,986 504,183 
2013 42,403 31,167 70,031 226,775 146,963 506,030 
2014 43,597 32,142 70,231 241,881 151,719 537,755 
2015 45,177 33,414 71,919 248,180 156,405 563,009 
Note: current PLN 
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Appendix 3: Interwar Counties
This section analyzes the spatial distribution of income inequality in interwar Poland. We construct county-
level top income shares using the income tax data for interwar Poland. The details of the data and 
methodology can be found in Appendix 1.4.  
One robust finding in the literature has been that top income shares were at the very high levels in the first 
half of the 20th century due to the strong concentration of capital income at the top of the distribution 
(Atkinson and Piketty 2007; 2010). Presumably, industrialisation and the advancement of capitalism were 
accompanied by the rising concentration of capital income. This could have resulted both from 
technological progress (Kaeble and Thoma 1991, p. 11), as we propose for Prussian Poland, and/or rising 
concentration of newly accumulated capital (e.g. Allen 2009). Yet, as noted by Milanović et al. (2010), 
income inequality in low-income pre-industrial societies was always limited by the subsistence level (the 
‘inequality possibility frontier’). It is only with the technological progress and hitherto unimaginable 
expansion of the production capacities that mean income and inequality entered into the positive 
relationship (Milanović 2016). Accordingly, we need to pay attention both to the rising importance of 
capital as the factor of production (functional distribution) and to its distribution. 
We provide suggestive evidence for the proposed explanations using the cross-section of counties from 
Interwar Poland. First, we look at the relationship between our measure of industrialisation and the top 1% 
income shares. We estimate two models: 
(1)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(2)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 × 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅 × 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅 × 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the top 1% income share in county i from partition p. We define our measure of 
industrialisation 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 as the share of population working in industry. In the first model, 𝛽𝛽 describes the 
correlation for the whole country. In the second model, we allow it to vary across the partition by the 
inclusion of three interaction terms between industrialisation and the Russian, Austrian and Prussian 
partitions dummies. 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is the share of people living in urban areas, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 are the partition fixed effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the error term. The model is estimated using a standard OLS with heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors.  
Panel A of the table below, Columns 1 to 3 show the estimates for the model without the interaction terms. 
A 10pp increase in the share of population working in industry is associated with 1.5pp increase in the top 
1% income shares. However, this relationship is likely to be driven by the urbanisation rate, as its inclusion 
leads to 𝛽𝛽 falling almost to zero (Columns 2 and 3). Columns 4 and 5 explore whether the relationship 
between industrialisation and inequality differs across the former partitions. We find a negative correlation 
within the former Prussian partition, 10pp increase in the share of population working in industry means 
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2.3pp drop in the top income share. The correlation in the former Russian partition is also significant and 
negative, but smaller in the absolute terms. In the former Austrian partition, the correlation is small and not 
statistically different from zero.  
Next, we regress the top 1% income share on the share of agriculture workers in the total population, which 
is a measure of agrarian capitalism. Panel B, Column 1, shows a positive, but insignificant, correlation 
between agrarian capitalism and inequalities. Column 2 adds the urbanisation ratio and the Gini coefficient 
for land ownership, the association between agrarian capitalism and top income shares increases and 
becomes significant. A 10pp increase in the share of agriculture workers is associated with 2.3pp increase 
in the top 1% income share. Columns 4 and 5 explore the heterogeneity across the former partition. The 
pattern is opposite as in the case of industrialisation, a 10pp increase in the share of agriculture workers is 
associated with almost 5pp increase in the top income share in the former Prussian partition, 1.65pp increase 
in the former Kingdom of Poland and 2.77pp drop in Galicia (not significant).  
Although these results are not causal, they provide suggestive evidence for the heterogeneous relationship 
between modernization and inequality across the Polish lands. The role of agriculture in the development 
of the Prussian partition is consistent with the fact that top income shares are more connected there with 
agrarian capitalism than with classic industrialisation. Similar, but smaller correlations are reported in the 
Russian partition. We suspect that this might be driven by the eastern-most areas, were traditionally the 
land-based magnates lived. On the other hand, in the Austrian partition the top income shares are negatively 
correlated with agrarian capitalism and do not seem to be related to industrialisation.  
Finally, Panel C documents the correlation between the urbanization rate and inequality. A 1pp increase in 
the urbanisation rates is associated with 0.06-0.08pp increase in the top income shares (Columns 1-3). The 
effect is heterogenous across the former partitions (Columns 4-5). In the former Austrian lands, the 
coefficient is the highest at 0.13pp, while in the former Russian the magnitude is one-third of the Austrian 
effect. Consistent with the discussion on the different roads to industrialisation, it is not surprising to find 
the strongest association between inequalities and urbanisation in Galicia.  
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Table: Results of county-level regressions for 1927. 
Panel A: Industrialisation 
Top 1% Income Share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Emp. Ind. Share 0,146 -0,029 -0,132 
(0,039)*** (0,049) (0,046)** 
Emp. Ind. Share -0,066 -0,225 
  X Prussian Partition (0,075) (0,06)*** 
Emp. Ind. Share 0,132 -0,123 
  X Russian Partition (0,046)*** (0,05)** 
Emp. Ind. Share 0,315 0,01 
  X Austrian Partition (0,121)** (0,091) 
Urbanisation 0,072 0,087 0,082 
(0,017)*** (0,016)*** (0,015)*** 
Counties 256 256 256 256 256 
Partition FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Agriculture Workers 
Top 1% Income Share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Emp. Share in Agr. 0,230 0,311 0,329 
(0,065)*** (0,056)*** (0,065)*** 
Emp. Share in Agr. 0,229 0,498 
  X Prussian Partition (0,107)* (0,079)*** 
Emp. Share in Agr. -0,073 0,165 
  X Russian Partition (0,121) (0,086)* 
Emp. Share in Agr. -0,713 -0,277 
  X Austrian Partition (0,421) (0,344) 
Urbanisation 0,066 0,067 0,057 
(0,018)*** (0,017)*** (0,015)*** 
Land Gini 0,042 0,039 0,035 
(0,015)** (0,015)** (0,015)* 
Counties 256 245 245 256 245 
Partition FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: robust standard errors in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% level, ** at the 1% level and * 
at the 5% level. 
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Panel C: Urbanization 
Top 1% Income Share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Urbanisation 0.065 0.082 0.080 
(0.011***) (0.020)*** (0.018)*** 
Urbanisation 0.047 0.087 
  X Prussian Partition (0.015)** (0.025)*** 
Urbanisation 0.049 0.041 
  X Russian Partition (0.015)** (0.018)* 
Urbanisation 0.108 0.132 
  X Austrian Partition (0.022)*** (0.026)*** 
Land Gini 0.047 0.040 0.036 
(0.014)** (0.015)*** (0.015)* 
Emp. Ind. Share -0.070 -0.067 -0.043 
(0.033)* (0.032*) (0.037) 
Emp. Share in Agr. 0.306 0.296 0.328 
(0.054)*** (0.062***) (0.064)*** 
Counties 256 245 245 256 245 
Partition FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: robust standard errors in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% level, ** at the 1% level and * 
at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 4: Distribution of Earnings
For the interwar period, estimates of the upper part of distribution are based on annual enterprise surveys 
of workers in medium-sized and large enterprises in processing and energy industries (those with more than 
20 employees, divided into three groups: enterprises up to 49 employees, enterprises with 50 to 199 em-
ployees, and enterprises above 200 employees). The Central Statistical Office and the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade conducted the survey quarterly in the months of February, May, August and November. Results 
were published in the form of tabulations ranged by the weekly wage. Published tabulations also provide 
earning bands by gender, by the size of the enterprise, by employees covered by collective agreements, by 
specific industry and by regions. 
It should be noted that indicated dispersion in the upper part of the distribution should be seen as a lower 
bound since small enterprises not covered by the survey generally paid much smaller wages (Landau 1933, 
p. 118). Czajkowski (1934) thus estimated earnings distribution for all workers in 1934. Dispersion at the
top is higher than in the case where only industrial workers in middle and large enterprises are covered, in 
the first place because of the now lower median wage. This corresponds to the Landau’s observation men-
tioned above.  
In socialist Poland the enterprise survey was conducted annually in the period from 1949 until 1989. The 
survey assessed earnings of full-time employees in September in socialized sector covering state-owned 
and cooperative enterprises. This covered around two-thirds of the total workforce, while excluded were 
self-employed and those working in the private sector. The predominant part of self-employed and employ-
ees in private sector was found in agriculture (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992, p. 257). The survey only 
included full-time workers in the month of September. Definition of earnings referred to gross monthly 
earnings (inclusive of bonuses and allowances) in the period from 1955 until 1970, while from 1970 the 
concept of net earnings was used instead Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, p. 257). However, Figure 8 
above shows that in 1970, for which both concepts were published, upper percentiles show markedly higher 
level (as proportion to median) when using gross concept  (Atkinson 2008, p. 320). From 1991 the private 
sector is covered as well (firms with more than six employees; Atkinson 2008, p. 320), and the gross concept 
of earnings is used.  
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Appendix A.5: Tables 
Table A1: Top income shares (in %) in the Partitioned Poland 1890s -1917 
Top: 1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.01% 1-0.1% 0.1-0.01% 
Galicia 
1898 11.7 8.9 4.6 1.6 7.1 2.9 
1899 11.3 8.4 4.1 1.5 7.1 2.7 
1900 12.8 9.7 5.2 2.3 7.6 2.8 
1901 14.3 10.9 5.9 2.7 8.4 3.2 
1902 13.6 10.1 5.1 2.0 8.5 3.1 
1903 13.3 9.9 4.8 1.8 8.5 3.0 
1904 13.4 10.0 5.0 1.8 8.5 3.1 
1905 12.9 9.6 4.8 1.8 8.1 3.0 
1906 12.5 9.4 4.8 7.7 
1907 13.3 9.8 4.9 1.8 8.4 3.0 
1908 13.3 9.8 4.7 1.1 8.5 3.6 
1909 12.8 9.3 4.4 1.5 8.4 2.9 
1910 11.7 8.6 4.0 1.3 7.7 2.7 
1911 12.4 9.1 4.3 1.5 8.1 2.8 
1912 11.6 8.5 4.1 1.4 7.5 2.7 
Province of Posen and Western Prussia 
1892 10.4 7.4 3.5 6.9 
1893 10.3 7.3 3.4 6.9 
1894 10.3 7.3 3.5 6.9 
1895 10.4 7.4 3.5 6.8 
1896 10.5 7.6 3.6 6.9 
1897 11.0 7.9 3.8 7.1 
1898 11.5 8.5 4.2 7.3 
1899 12.2 9.1 4.8 7.4 
1900 12.2 9.1 4.7 7.5 
1901 11.8 8.7 4.5 7.4 
1902 11.5 8.4 4.1 7.4 
1903 11.5 8.5 4.3 
1904 11.9 8.8 4.5 
1905 12.4 9.5 5.0 7.4 
1906 12.4 9.5 5.0 7.4 
1907 12.5 9.6 5.1 7.3 
1908 12.4 9.5 5.1 7.2 
1909 12.3 9.5 5.2 7.2 
1910 12.5 9.6 5.2 7.4 
1911 12.8 9.8 5.4 7.4 
1912 13.0 10.0 5.4 7.5 
1913 13.6 10.5 5.7 7.9 
1914 14.3 11.3 6.4 7.9 
1915 17.3 14.2 8.8 8.5 
1916 20.1 17.0 11.1 9.0 
1917 20.0 17.0 11.2 8.7 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics. Distribution of fiscal income among tax units. 
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Table A2: Top income shares (in %) in Poland 1925-2015 
Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
1925 10.5 7.2 3.1 0.9 
1926 10.8 7.6 3.3 0.9 
1927 11.8 8.4 3.6 1 
1928 11.9 8.6 4 1.2 
1929 25.3 12.0 8.5 3.8 1.2 
1930 4.3 1.3 
1931 
1935 11.6 5.3 1.6 
1936 15.6 11.3 5.1 1.5 
1992 18.7 7.8 
1993 19.4 8.4 
1994 22.0 9.9 
1995 24.4 11.0 
1996 22.9 9.4 
1997 22.8 10.3 
1998 24.0 11.0 
1999 23.3 10.4 
2000 24.2 10.5 
2001 23.7 10.9 
2002 24.6 11.2 
2003 24.5 10.3 
2004 25.9 12.0 
2005 26.7 12.9 
2006 27.9 14.0 
2007 27.2 14.5 
2008 26.0 14.4 
2009 25.9 12.8 
2010 26.0 12.4 
2011 25.5 12.5 
2012 25.6 12.2 
2013 26.0 12.3 
2014 26.0 12.6 
2015 25.9 12.9 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics. Distribution of fiscal income among tax units. 
72 
Table A3: Income shares (in %) in Poland 1983-2015 
Bottom 50% Middle 40% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.1% 
1983 31.3 46.8 21.8 13.3 4.2 0.8 
1984 30.5 46.9 22.6 14.1 4.7 1.0 
1985 31.4 46.5 22.2 13.4 4.2 0.8 
1986 31.2 46.6 22.3 13.5 4.2 0.7 
1987 31.1 47.2 21.8 13.2 4.3 0.9 
1988 32.2 46.4 21.4 12.8 4.1 0.9 
1989 30.9 46.6 22.6 13.8 4.4 0.9 
1992 29.3 44.3 26.4 17.7 7.8 2.9 
1993 28.7 44.2 27.2 18.4 8.5 3.7 
1994 27.3 43.0 29.6 20.8 10.0 4.0 
1995 25.9 42.0 32.0 23.1 11.2 4.1 
1996 26.2 42.4 31.4 21.7 9.3 2.9 
1997 26.5 42.6 31.0 21.6 10.0 3.7 
1998 26.2 41.9 31.9 22.7 10.7 3.9 
1999 26.6 42.3 31.0 22.1 10.1 3.3 
2000 25.8 41.8 32.4 22.9 9.9 3.0 
2001 25.7 42.2 32.1 22.4 10.3 3.7 
2002 25.1 41.8 33.1 23.3 10.5 3.6 
2003 24.7 41.9 33.4 23.2 9.6 2.7 
2004 24.3 41.7 34.0 24.5 11.8 4.5 
2005 22.8 42.5 34.7 25.1 12.2 4.9 
2006 23.2 41.3 35.5 26.0 12.9 5.3 
2007 23.3 40.8 35.9 26.8 14.2 6.2 
2008 23.4 40.6 36.0 26.5 13.7 5.8 
2009 23.8 41.3 34.9 25.3 12.1 4.5 
2010 24.0 41.2 34.7 25.1 12.0 4.3 
2011 23.9 41.2 34.9 25.5 12.1 4.5 
2012 24.0 41.0 35.0 25.5 12.1 4.5 
2013 23.9 41.4 34.7 25.1 11.9 4.4 
2014 24.0 41.2 34.8 25.5 12.3 4.5 
2015 24.3 41.1 34.6 25.4 12.5 4.4 
Source: authors’ computation based on combined household surveys and income tax statistics. Distribution of pre-tax national 
income (before taxes and transfers, except pensions and unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults 
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Table A4: Top income shares (in %) in the Prussian Poland 1892-1918 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics. 
Top 1% Top 0.1% 
Province: West Prussia Province of Posen Silesia West Prussia Province of Posen Silesia 
1892 10.4 10.3 15.0 3.15 3.63 6.95 
1893 10.2 10.2 14.6 3.03 3.54 6.68 
1894 10.3 10.2 14.7 3.15 3.52 6.70 
1895 10.3 10.3 14.9 3.14 3.62 6.76 
1896 10.3 10.6 15.2 3.08 3.85 6.91 
1897 11.0 10.9 15.7 3.57 3.87 7.16 
1898 11.4 11.6 16.0 3.89 4.37 7.35 
1899 11.7 12.6 16.6 4.13 5.24 7.88 
1900 11.7 12.6 16.8 4.08 5.20 8.04 
1901 11.2 12.3 16.7 3.75 4.92 8.08 
1902 11.0 12.0 15.9 3.49 4.60 7.25 
1903 12.0 4.78 
1904 12.6 5.11 
1905 11.6 13.4 16.2 3.96 5.74 7.52 
1906 11.4 13.6 16.4 3.91 5.88 7.71 
1907 11.3 13.8 16.3 3.92 6.02 7.77 
1908 11.3 13.6 16.3 4.06 5.93 7.85 
1909 11.1 13.6 16.1 3.88 6.11 7.90 
1910 11.3 13.8 15.9 3.93 6.12 7.54 
1911 
1912 
1913 12.2 14.8 16.3 4.48 6.70 7.75 
1914 12.5 15.8 16.5 4.73 7.70 8.05 
1915 15.1 19.4 18.1 10.46 9.11 
1916 17.4 22.6 23.8 13.23 14.09 
1917 17.2 22.4 23.6 13.02 13.52 
1918 13.9 20.5 11.22 
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Appendix A.6: Figures 
Figure A1: Real income per adult in Poland and Western Europe 1910-2015 
Source: authors’ computation based on WID and Maddison (2013). Western Europe is the unweighted average of 
Germany, France and UK. 
Figure A2: The Province of Posen – decomposition of the top percentile 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics. 
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Figure A3: West Prussia – decomposition of the top percentile 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics. 
Figure A4: The Province of Posen – decomposition of the top 0.1 percentile. 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics. 
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Figure A5: Shares of agriculture in employment and productivity in agriculture, as a percentage of the 
national average 
Source: the data from Tipton 1976, Table 6.2 (p.106); Grant 2002, Tab. 2 (net value added per full-time labour unit). 
Figure A6: Galicia: total taxed income by sources. 
Source: authors’ computation based on income tax statistics.  
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Figure A7: The composition of top groups by income source 
Source: author’s computation based on income tax statistics. 
Figure A8: Top 1 Incomes Share in Poland, 1983-2015 
Source: Authors’ computation (see Section 2). Distribution of pre-tax national income (before taxes and transfers, 
except pensions and unemployment. insurance) among equal-split adults 
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Figure A9: Gini coefficient in Poland, 1983-2015 
Source: Authors’ computation (see Section 2). Distribution of pre-tax national income (before taxes and transfers, 
except pensions and unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults  
Figure A10: Share of transfers in the bottom 50 and middle 40 income groups.  
Source: Authors’ computation (see Section 2). Distribution of income reported in HBS among equal-split adults 
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Figure A11: Distributed income from corporations, 2000-2014 
Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland, National Accounts. `Withdrawals’ from unincorporated firms is re-
ceived in total by households 
Figure A12: Capital share in national income in Germany; top 1 income share in Germany and 
Poland (distribution of fiscal income among tax units). 
Source: WID 
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